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Summary findings
Drawing on original surveys of agricultural traders,  Quantities are not pooled for transport and storage
Fafchamps and Gabre-Madhin examine how traders  so as to achieve returns to scale.
operate in two Sub-Saharan African countries, Benin and  *  Interseasonal and interregional arbitrage is not
Malawi. They find the following:  feasible for most traders, who prefer to operate day to
* The largest transaction costs for traders are search  day in a small territory.
and transport.  Search methods rely principally on  This information  provides some important insights
personal visits by the trader, which raises search costs.  into how agricultural trade could be improved. It
And since enterprises are very small, transport represents  suggests possible policy interventions in four main areas:
a large share of marketing costs.  increasing traders'  asset base, reducing transaction risk,
* Brand recognition, grading, and quality certification  promoting more sophisticated business practices, and
are nonexistent.  reducing physical marketing costs.
* Brokers and agents are not organized in commodity
exchanges.
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A large number of studies have addressed the question of market integration in the post-market
reform era in sub-Saharan Africa (Badiane and Shively, 1998; Dercon, 1995; Negassa and Jayne,  1999).
These studies rely primarily on the analysis of price co-movements at the market level.  While this type of
analysis is highly informative in providing snapshot evidence of market segmentation or lack of price
transmission at a given point in time, it does not provide significant insights on why markets are poorly
integrated or what  constraints are faced by  market actors.  Relatively few studies have  addressed the
microeconomic behavior of market participants, such as individual traders or firms (Bryceson, 1993; Barrett,
1997; Gabre-Madhin, 1998; Fafchamps and Minten, 1999).  These studies highlight the importance of
transaction costs facing individual traders, the role of intermediaries, and of relationships and social capital.
Even fewer studies have  attempted to  link trader characteristics and market behavior with  standards of
market  performance at the trader level.
The present  paper  fills  this  gap  by  documenting traders'  assets,  their  trading practices  and
commercial activities, and their capacity to undertake spatial and temporal arbitrage.  This paper presents
original evidence for Benin and Malawi on how traders'  assets, including financial, physical, human, and
social capital, influence their commercial activities and, ultimately, their arbitrage behavior.  An enduring
puzzle in the market literature in sub-Saharan Africa is why marketing margins remain high despite reforms
and the relative lack of sophistication of liberalized markets (Beynon et al., 1992; Jayne and Jones, 1997).
The approach taken in this paper is to empirically investigate traders' assets and trading practices
and link these not only to evidence on traders' gross margins but also to their net margins using detailed data
on marketing, operating, and transaction costs.  This approach is important for a number of reasons.  First,
despite reforms,  traders  in  liberalized markets  across sub-Saharan Africa  continue  to  operate  in  an
environment of suspicion, viewed by policymakers and laypersons alike as alike as speculative, usurious, or
benefiting from excessive profits. Second, an emerging conclusion of the post-reform era is that market
liberalization is necessary but not sufficient to bring about efficient markets.  Thus, a closer look at the
individual determinants of performance is warranted.  Finally, in the wake of reforms, it remains unclear
2what is the appropriate role of the public sector.  Again, understanding the source  of the  constrained
behavior of market participant can serve to highlight areas of where intervention can have an impact, in
terms of policy as well as infrastructure and institutions.
This paper is based on the conceptual framework presented in Figure 1. In this framework, policy,
institutions, infrastructure are exogenous to the behavior of traders in the market.  Thus, policies that limit,
regulate, or promote private sector market participation will influence traders' access to and accumulation of
assets as well as their business practices, and their commercial activities.  Assets, which are specific to
individual trading firmns,  include human resources, physical capital in the form of buildings and equipment,
financial assets, and social capital.  Trading practices include traders'  inspection of goods, methods of
payments,  their reliance  on  networks,  their  use  of interrnediaries such  as  agents  and  brokers, their
contractual performance, their search behavior, their enforcement of property rights, and their investment
and specialization  in agricultural trade.  Assets and business practices are also influenced by the existence or
lack of formal market institutions such as commercial law and dispute settlement mechanisms, inspection
services, referral agencies, trade associations, and information systems.  Both assets and practices along
with infrastructure, such as roads, vehicle fleets, conmnunications,  and public  storage facilities, directly
influence the extent of traders' commercial activities, viewed in the tenns of purchases and sales, as well as
their transport, storage, and transformation of agricultural products.  Finally, the analysis considers the links
between traders'  assets and practices as well as their commercial activities on how efficient their market
activities are, viewed in terms of the relationship between the costs faced by individual traders and their
margins.  This broad framework enables the analysis of whether better-endowed traders are more or less
efficient, whether larger firms in terms of scale or scope of activities influence efficiency, and the impact of
trading practices on commercial behavior, among other possible experiments.
In addition, the paper takes a comparative focus on trader performance between Benin and Malawi,
which adds a rich dimension to the analysis. Benin, in francophone West Africa, represents an environment
in which private market activity has a long history and in which government intervention has traditionally
been limited, with the exception of cotton (Kherallah et al., 2000).  In sharp contrast, Malawi, along with
3others in Eastern and Southern Africa, has had, up to recently, extensive state intervention in marketing and
protection of smaliholders (Jayne and Jones, 1997).  Thus, the comparative focus provides insights on the
role of history and tradition in shaping trading norns and in asset accumulation.
Figure  1  The  Operation  of  Traders  in  the  Market
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42.  Survey Methodology
2.1  Target  Population
In both Benin and Malawi, the survey of traders targeted input traders, food crop traders, and cash
crop traders at both the wholesaler and retailer level.  In addition, a market-level survey was conducted in
order to obtain information on the marketing environment for each of the selected markets in which trader
surveys were conducted.
In both countries, food crop traders are primarily independent traders working on their own account,
who could be identified by their location in the market.  With the exception of cotton, this is also true for
cash crop traders in Benin, who often trade in both food and cash crops such as pineapples.  However, in
Malawi, in the case of tobacco trading, field observations  revealed a similar structure of traders operating as
agents on behalf of very large tobacco traders.  Conversely to the trade of inputs, these traders acted as
buying agents, thus buying tobacco from farmers on the account of a large company and  delivering the
purchased tobacco to the auction floor. Thus, in the case of cash crop trading in Malawi, the survey targeted
these buying agents.
2.2  Survey Site Selection and Sampling Frame
The survey sites for the trader surveys in both countries are market towns in which a good sample of
agricultural traders existed.  These market towns were selected on the basis of their importance in the
agricultural economy of the country, in terms of flows and volumes of the three types of products: major
food crops, cash crops, and agricultural inputs.  An additional criterion used to select survey sites was the
availability of secondary price  data for the market towns.  According to these criteria, 24 markets were
identified in Benin and 40 markets were identified in Malawi (see Table 1).
In both Benin and Malawi, a sample population of 800 retail and wholesale traders was targeted,
broken down into 200 input traders, 200 cash traders, and 400 food crop traders.  Due to the absence of
reliable census information on the population of traders in both countries, the first step in drawing a random
5sample was to conduct a census of traders in the selected markets.  In Benin, this task proved extremely
difficult given the very large number of retailers in the major markets and the mobility of traders between
market days.  Thus, the process followed in Benin to conduct a census of traders was to obtain lists of
traders from ONASA (Office National d'Appui  a  la Securite Alimentaire), and  the regional bureaus of
Ministry of Commerce.  In addition to these lists, the survey team undertook a count of traders present on
the market day, and used these three sources of information to construct a census from which a sample was
randomly draw, resulting  in a total sample of 663 food crop and cash crop traders.
In Malawi, a reconnaissance survey of traders was conducted in July-August 1999 in order to count
and identify traders according to their status (independent, buying agent, or selling agent), their level (retail
or wholesale), and the types of products they traded.  The information on the name, type, and location of
traders from the reconnaissance survey were entered into a spreadsheet and the sample was drawn  randomly
from the census data using a computer algorithm.  Thus, for the three types of products, a total sample of
738 traders was interviewed in Malawi.  Thus, for both countries, the total sample of independent traders is
1371.
2.3  Survey Instrument
Initially, a questionnaire was designed for independent  agricultural traders in both countries. During
the course of field visits, the questionnaire was tailored to the specific market conditions of each country,
while at the same time maintaining the same structure and format across the two countries. The coverage of
the survey instrument is not only very broad, but also innovative in the type of infornation gathered.  Thus,
the trader questionnaire covered the following main areas:  (a) defining the trading enterprise; (b) trader
characteristics; (c) factors of productions and operating costs; (d) trading activities and marketing costs; (e)
relationships and coordination costs.  One innovation in the  survey instrument is  that, in addition to
annually constructing volumes of sales, purchases, and storage, the questionnaire also addresses specific
arbitrage behavior on the last completed wholesale transaction.  Moreover, in contrast to typical market
surveys which focus on trading activities and business assets, data were collected on  search behavior and
6costs, quality inspection, contract enforcement and  dispute settlement,  information, and  property rights
enforcement. Obtaining this type of data, which are generally more sensitive and culture-specific, involved
considerable  dialogue with the survey team and focused training.
Table 1.  Survey Sites and Sample Population
Benin  Malawi
Department  Market  Sample  Region  Market  Sample  Region  Market  Sample
Atacora  Djougou  30  South  Balaka  16  Central  Nkhotakota  2
Kassouallah  20  Liwonde  20  Salima  16
Natitingou  15  Ntaja  9  Dowa  3
Tanguieta  10  Mangochi  29  Mponela  20
Pehunco  20  Monkey  Bay  4  Ntchisi  14
Atlantique  Cotonou  100  Chiponde  34  Kasungu  3
Sekou  10  Jali  21  Mchinji  2
Borgou  Parakou  65  Limbe  31  Lilongwe  24
Malanville  30  Lunzu  63  Msundwe  26
Nikki  36  Mwanza  6  Mitundu  50
Banikouara  20  Nsanje  24  Chimbiya  8
Gaamia  15  Balunga  9  Njonja  20
Mono  Azove  45  Nchalo  12  Thete  13
Come  20  Thyolo  19
Oueme  Ketou  41  Luchenza  19  North  Lizulu  36
Pobe  40  Muloza  28  Ntcheu  22
Azowilisse  10  Chiringa  17  Chitipa  20
Ouando  36  Phalombe  11  Karonga  13
Zou  Bohicon  55  Rumphi  7
Glazoue  30  Mzuzu  45
Ouesse  15  Mzimba  5
No. Markets  21  No. Markets  40
No. Traders  663  No. Traders  738
73.  Business Assets
3.1  Financial  Resources
Working Capital.  The money traders use to purchase agricultural products and pay marketing
costs, their working capital, is fairly large by the standards of the countries concerned: $1470 in Benin,
$560 in Malawi. This is equivalent to two or three times the annual GDP per capita. The median is much
smaller, at  $333 and  $136, respectively. We see that, contrary to expectations,  working capital is 2 to 3
three times larger in Benin than in Malawi: if profits are larger in Malawi, it is not because Malawian traders
use more finance. The majority of respondents  report augmnenting  their working capital relative to the
previous year.
Table 2.  Working Capital of Traders in Benin and Malawi (US$)
Benin
Mean  S.d.  Min.  Max.  Median  N  % 0
Startup capital  166  926  0  20000  50  637  3.0%
Current  capital  1471  9341  0  216667  333  655  2.3%
Capital last year  1168  7028  0  166667  267  620  1.9%
Own capital  963  3099  0  53333  281  654  5.0%
Malawi
Mean  S.d.  Min.  Max.  Median  N  % 0
Startup capital  80  342  0  4773  11  738  0.0%
Current capital  560  1965  2  34091  136  738  0.0%
Capital last year  425  1351  0  22727  91  725  0.3%
Own capital  548  1729  0  25000  136  738  0.7%
a  At the time of survey, exchange rates used are 1 US $= CFA 600 and 1 US $ = MK 45.
8Credit.  Most working capital comes from internal sources. External finance is extremely limited.
Current dues to lenders are but a tiny fraction of working  capital. Although one fifth to one third of
respondents have a bank account, only a tiny fraction of them has an overdraft facility.  Surprisingly, those
with an overdraft facility do not appear to make use of it-perhaps  because the interest rate is high.
Loans from financial institutions are rare and heavily concentrated on  a small number of large
traders. In Malawi, most formal loans come from a parastatal. The only source of external finance that is
used by a sizeable proportion of respondents is loans from friends and relatives - 8% of the sample in Benin,
21% in Malawi. But these loans are for relatively small amounts:  $947  on average in Benin,  $55 in
Malawi.
A large proportion of surveyed traders (50% in Benin, 75% in Malawi) know a friend or relative
they could borrow from. The amount involved is moderate --  $250 to  $300 -- and the average duration of
the loan limited to 3 months. Regarding alternative savings instrument, 70% of Benin traders are member of
a rotating saving and credit association (ROSCA) vs. only 2% in Malawi.  Supplier credit is a much more
frequent form of credit. We revisit this issue when we discuss relationships with suppliers and clients.
9Table 3.  Formal and Informal Credit in Benin and Malawi
Benin  Malawi
Mean  S.d.  Min.  Max.  Median  N  %0  Mean  S.d.  Min.  Max.  Median  N  % 0
Actual Credit by Source a
Financial institution  116  539  0  8333  0  659  86.9%  5  42  0  682  0  728  97.8%
Parastatal  not applicable  16  140  0  2273  0  727  96.1%
Alternative credit institution  4  47  0  833  0  659  99.1%  6  52  0  750  0  728  96.2%
Moneylender  4  68  0  1667  0  659  99.4%  19  425  0  11364  0  727  97.0%
Friend or relative  79  1014  0  25000  0  661  91.7%  12  57  0  795  0  727  79.0%
Other source  10  211  0  5333  0  656  99.4%  0  13  0  341  0  725  99.9%
Banking
% Traders with bank account  35%  0  0  1  0  661  428  22%  0  0  1  0  735  570
% Traders with overdraft facility  2%  0  0  1  0  649  636  1%  0  0  1  0  729  723
Maximum overdraft a  138  1646  0  33333  0  655  98.3%  6  78  0  1136  0  729  99.0%
Maximumuseda  5  131  0  3333  0  649  99.8%  4  56  0  1136  0  728  99.3%
Interest rate  not applicable  0  21  25  0  65  2  11  5
Access to Informal Credit
Potential lenders  1.3  2.2  0  20  1  659  329  1.9  2.0  0  20  2  738  184
Maximumcouldborrowa  254  1122  0  16667  0  659  333  318  1335  0  18182  45  738  184
Days could keep loan  91  1171  0  30000  0  659  350  88  142  0  1460  30  738  185
% Traders member of ROSCA  70%  0  0  1  1  661  200  2%  0  0  1  0  721  709
Amount withdrawn  a  206  684  0  13333  50  659  238  2  22  0  341  0  720  712
a  US$ equivalent. At the time of survey, exchange rates used are 1 US $= CFA 600 and 1 US $ = MK 45.
103.2  Physical Capital
In  terms  of  equipment,  surveyed traders  appear  surprisingly unequipped.  The  overwhelming
majority of them do not own (serious) weighting equipment, transportation, or storage facilities. Only 3% of
the total sample has a telephone. In terms of value, vehicles are clearly the most important equipment item.
But ownership of vehicles is heavily concentrated, with a  large proportion of surveyed traders without
vehicles -- 85% and 94% in Benin and Malawi, respectively. The total value of vehicles is about 9 times
higher in Benin than Malawi. Contrary to working capital where we see evidence of increase over time,
equipment appears very stable, with virtually no change relative to the previous year-a  6% increase only in
the total number of vehicles, compared to a reported 29% increase in total working capital.
In terms of buildings, 59% of Benin traders and 35% of Malawian traders buy and sell from their
residence. Half of them  store at  their residence as well.  In terms of  wealth, one  a  quarter of Benin
respondents own their home, vs. three quarters of Malawian respondents. At  $13,700, the value of a Benin
home, however, is about 12 times higher on average than a Malawian home (t value of 6.81) -- which may
explain  why  fewer  Benin  respondents  can  afford  a  home.  Higher  population  density  and  level  of
urbanization probably account for the difference in property values.
In terms of storage outside of their own residence, 24% and 39% of Benin and Malawian traders,
respectively, store in a dedicated facility outside their home-either  owned or rented from someone else.
The combined storage capacity of exclusive use facilities is on average 7 metric tons in Benin and 12 metric
tons in Malawi (median of 1.4 tons in both countries). Half of Benin's traders and one third of Malawian
traders also have access to a collective storage facility, usually located at or around the market. The cost of
storage in these facilities is about 25 cents per day per ton in Benin and  3 in Malawi, which seems high.
11Table 4.  Physical Capital and Investment by Traders in Benin and Malawi
Benin  Malawi
% Traders who own:  Mean  S.d.  Median  N  Mean  S.d.  Median  N
Scales  8%  0  0  663  29%  0  0  738
Processing equipment  6%  0  0  663  1%  0  0  738
Non-motorized transport  13%  0  0  663  58%  0  1  738
Motorized transport  15%  0  0  663  6%  0  0  738
Shop and storage facility  10%  0  0  663  11%  0  0  738
Telephone  4%  0  0  663  1%  0  0  737
Average number by trader:
Scales  0.13  0.52  0  663  0.51  1.71  0  736
Processing equipment  0.11  0.58  0  663  0.01  0.18  0  738
Non-motorized  transport  0.20  0.57  0  663  0.82  0.96  1  737
Motorized  transport  0.32  1.04  0  663  0.08  0.39  0  738
Shop and storage facility  0.13  0.44  0  661  0.13  0.37  0  738
Telephone  0.03  0.18  0  657  0.01  0.12  0  737
Average number a year ago:
Scales  0.13  0.52  0  663  0.47  1.68  0  738
Processing equipment  0.11  0.59  0  663  0.01  0.18  0  738
Non-motorized transport  0.19  0.56  0  663  0.78  0.93  1  738
Motorized  transport  0.30  1.02  0  663  0.07  0.38  0  738
Shop and storage facility  0.12  0.43  0  663  0.12  0.36  0  738
Telephone  0.03  0.18  0  663  0.01  0.12  0  738
Current  value of:.
Scales  61  305  0  661  46  249  0  736
Processing equipment  32  281  0  663  64  1274  0  738
Non-motorized transport  21  83  0  659  34  57  23  736
Motorized transport  3277  24603  0  657  357  3224  0  738
Shop and storage facility  106  723  0  648  188  1174  0  737
Value  a year  ago:  n
Scales  61  304  0  663  39  186  0  736
Processing equipment  33  281  0  663  16  218  0  738
Non-motorized transport  20  82  0  663  35  112  20  737
a  US$ equivalent.  At the tirne of  survey, exchange rates used  are  1 US $= CFA  600 and  1 US $ = MK  45.
123.3  Human capital and resources
Education and Experience. Two thirds of surveyed Benin traders have no education as opposed to
only 10% of Malawian traders.  Half of the respondents have worked in another business before initiating
the current enterprise. Benin traders are more experienced than  their Malawian counterparts with about
twice the number of years of experience both in the current enterprise and in a previous business. Benin
traders are also much more likely to have worked in their parents'  business (67% of those with previous
business experience) than  Malawian  traders (4%).  Malawian traders  acquired prior  experience nearly
exclusively through another business of their own. Another difference between the two countries is that one
sixth of Benin traders have worked as an agent prior to initiating their current trade operation, vs. only 3% in
Malawi.
With respect to the last occupation prior to becoming involved with agricultural trade, in both
countries one third of traders previously worked in agriculture or food processing, one third in trade, and one
third in other occupations. Previous trade experience is nearly always in non-agricultural trade in the case of
Malawi, against one third of respondents with previous trade experience in Benin. Malawi traders are also
more likely to have been wage workers or students prior to entering agricultural trade. Malawi traders arrive
to  agricultural trade  from quite  a  different  starting point.  This  possibly  reflects  the  impact  of  trade
liberalization.
13Table 5.  Human Capital of Traders in Benin and Malawi
B3enin  Malawi
Education  (%  of traders)
Trader-  no education/  illiterate  68.08  9.90
Mother  - no education/illiterate  97.71  26.70
Father-  no education/illiterate  90.40  53.20
Marital  status  (%  of traders)
Married  89.26  82.20
Single  3.78  7.50
Divorced  1.82  5.00
Widow/er  5.14  5.30
Traders'  Age
Mean  (S.d)  40.71(10.52)  33.44  (9.16)
N  660  738
Number  of languages  spoken
Mean  (S.d)  2.65  (1.39)  2.14  (1.15)
N  661  738
Past  primary  occupation  (% traders)
Agriculture/fishery/livestock  18.94  27.60
Agricultural  trade  23.33  2.20
Non-agricultural  trade  11.97  30.10
Wage/civil  servant  1.36  13.70
Student  7.88  12.20
None/housework  13.03  8.50
Employees.  Apart from the trader himself or herself, surveyed enterprises do not employ abundant
manpower. The average total manpower of surveyed firms is 2.2 individuals in Benin and 1.5 in Malawi.
Most employees are family workers. Non-family employees only amount to 0.4 to 0.5 persons on average.
Employment levels also appear extremely stable, with no perceptible trend in employment levels.
Wages paid are very low. A large proportion of family workers receive no wage-around  70% in
Benin, 40% in Malawi. Non-family workers nearly always receive a wage. Cases when they do not receive a
wage probably correspond to apprenticeship contracts. For those non-family workers who receive a wage,
the remuneration level is around $7 per month in Benin and  $27 in Malawi. The large discrepancy in wage
levels may be due to the presence of a small number of large, formal employers in Malawi. Contrary to
14micro-enterprises where wages are notoriously low, large African employers pay higher wages (Mazumdar
and Mazaheri 1998, Velenchik 1997).
Trading enterprises are not very centralized. In addition to the owner, 1.1 persons on average are
authorized to buy for the firm in Benin, and 0.6 persons in Malawi. Similar though slightly lower numbers
are reported for those authorized to sell for the firm. Surveyed trading firns  operate an average of 4.7 days a
week in Benin, vs. 6.1 days a week in Malawi.
On average, the owner is absent for 12 days a year in Benin, and 46 days in Malawi. Absences are
mostly motivated by the need for the trader to visit distant purchase and sales market. In most cases, the firm
continues to operate in the trader's absence. In the absence of the trader, the business is normally run by an
employee of the firm, preferably a relative, in 45% of the cases in Benin and 17% in Malawi. It is also very
common for the trader to rely on someone external to the firm-either  a friend or a relative-to  look after
the business in his or her absence. This occurs in 48% of the cases in Benin and 64% of the cases in Malawi.
If such a person cannot be found, the business closes.
15Table 6.  Human Resources of Trading  Enterprises in Benin and Malawi
Benin  Malawi
Mean  S.d.  Min Max  Median  N  % 0  Mean  S.d.  Min  Max  Median  N  % 0
Number  of people involved:
Owner  1.2  2.7  0  50  1  663  1  1.0  0.1  1  2  1  736  0
Fanily employees  0.8  1.9  0  30  0  663  405  0.2  0.6  0  7  0  731  636
Non-family employees  0.4  1.2  0  13  0  663  581  0.5  1.7  0  20  0  732  590
Total manpower  2.2  3.7  0  67  1  655  1  1.5  1.3  0  22  1  729  0
Total months  worked:
Owner  13.7  30.0  0  500  12  660  2  12.1  1.8  0  24  12  736  1
Family employees  8.7  20.6  0  300  0  659  405  1.9  6.4  0  84  0  731  636
Non-family employees  3.9  13.5  0  120  0  662  580  3.9  12.8  0  216  0  733  591
Number of people a year ago:
Owner  1.3  2.9  1  50  1  661  0  1.1  0.9  0  12  1  732  6
Family ernployees  0.7  1.3  0  14  0  659  405  0.2  0.8  0  12  0  730  641
Non-famnily  emnployees  0.4  1.3  0  13  0  663  579  0.5  2.0  0  30  0  733  597
Wages:a
Monthly wage -farnily empl.  5.3  32.8  0  507  0  254  175  12.2  17.4  0  91  8  95  37
Monthly wage-non-family  empl.  5.1  14.5  0  71  0  53  15  26.5148.3  1  1728  10  139  0
Annual wage bill - family employees  34  287  0  6083  0  659  580  27  149  0  1773  0  731  673
Annual wage bill -non-family enipl.  15  215  0  5069  0  633  595  84  820  0 20739  0  730  590
Total annual  wage bill  51  390  0  6083  0  629  524  IlI  853  0 20739  0  726  554
Delegation
Number authorized to sell
(other than owner)  1.1  1  0  11  1  661  275  0.6  1  0  4  0  738  385
Number authorized to buy
(otherthanowner)  0.8  2  0  13  0  660  412  0.5  1  0  8  0  738  489
Days per week in operation  4.7  2.4  1  7  6  649  0  6.1  1.2  2  7  6  736  0
Daysownerisabsentperyr.  12.4  15.6  0  120  12  643  276  45.5  45.3  0  312  36  737  129
Operates in owner's absence (%)  71%  0  0  1  1  653  189  55%  0  0  1  1  702  317
a  US$ equivalent. At the time of survey, exchange rates used are I US $= CFA 600 and I US $ = MK 45.
16.4  Social Capital
Family.  In terms of parental background, the two countries differ little as far as fathers are
concerned: they are overwhelmingly farmers. Mothers have different occupations, however, with over half
of them involved in trade in Benin vs. ten percent in Malawi. Benin mothers also have a much longer
experience in trade than their Malawian counterparts: 21 years of experience on average vs. 9 in Malawi.  In
terms of gender, 80% of traders  are women vs. 36% in Malawi, reflecting a long  tradition of female
involvement in trade along the West African coast.
Family size also differs across the two trader populations, with Benin traders having more sons,
daughters, brothers and sisters. Family involvement in trade also varies: Benin traders have more than twice
as many close relatives involved in trade than Malawian traders.
Results therefore suggest that involvement in trade is more ancient in Benin. Traders are older, have
more experience, and have had much exposure to trade from their parents and close relatives. One would
consequently expect Benin traders to be more sophisticated and more efficient. Because their background is
very  'traditional',  however, the  sophistication they  can achieve is  likely to  follow informnal  avenues-
building up social networks, achieving trust through personal relationships (Fafchamps and Minten, 1999,
2000, 2001a).
In contrast, Malawian traders are younger, better educated, and more likely to come from a non-
agricultural or wage employment background. We would therefore expect them to be more 'modern', that is,
more inclined to experiment with new marketing techniques and modern technology such as motorized
vehicles, telephones, and formal contracts. Better education may also enable Malawian traders to delegate
authority to subordinates  and thus to grow and have larger firms.
17Table 7.  Traders' Social Capital: Family
Benin  Malawi
Mean  S.d. Median  N  Mean  S.d.  Median  N
Number:
Live father  0.46  0.70  0  661  0.48  0.50  0  737
Live mother  0.66  0.60  1  661  0.74  0.44  1  737
Spouse  1.08  0.74  1  661  0.82  0.41  1  737
Son over 15  1.35  1.77  1  662  0.44  0.91  0  737
Daughter over 15  1.31  1.78  1  662  0.41  0.89  0  737
Brother over 15  2.77  2.90  2  657  1.85  1.39  2  737
Sister over 15  2.62  3.02  2  655  1.91  1.56  2  737
Number in trader's
business:  0.94  0.29
Live father  0.00  0.04  0  661  0.00  0.04  0  737
Live mother  0.04  0.20  0  661  0.01  0.07  0  737
Spouse  0.06  0.32  0  662  0.12  0.33  0  737
Sonover 15  0.12  0.55  0  662  0.04  0.30  0  737
Daughter over 15  0.23  0.63  0  662  0.01  0.08  0  737
Brother over 15  0.02  0.18  0  662  0.07  0.31  0  737
Sister over 15  0.12  0.46  0  661  0.01  0.12  0  737
Another relative  0.34  1.14  0  663  0.03  0.31  0  738
Number in another
trading business:  2.89  1.42
Live father  0.07  0.26  0  661  0.08  0.27  0  737
Live mother  0.27  0.56  0  661  0.12  0.33  0  737
Spouse  0.32  0.77  0  662  0.22  0.42  0  737
Son over 15  0.13  0.53  0  662  0.07  0.30  0  737
Daughter over 15  0.32  0.95  0  662  0.04  0.25  0  737
Brother over 15  0.42  1.18  0  658  0.56  0.85  0  737
Sister over 15  1.37  2.12  1  657  0.33  0.75  0  737
Number of wage
workers:
Live father  0.04  0.39  0  661  0.03  0.18  0  737
Live mother  0.01  0.08  0  661  0.00  0.06  0  737
Spouse  0.22  0.90  0  662  0.08  0.36  0  737
Son over 15  0.07  0.34  0  662  0.07  0.33  0  737
Daughter over 15  0.05  0.37  0  662  0.02  0.20  0  737
Brother over 15  0.39  1.08  0  659  0.34  0.69  0  737
Sister over 15  0.08  0.43  0  657  0.09  0.34  0  737
18Trading Contacts and Associations.  We find that respondents know on average 37 to 42 other
traders split more or less equally between purchase and sales markets. Medians are 23 for Benin and 20 for
Malawi. The two countries, however, differ in the number of traders respondent knew at start-up: 17 on
average in Benin vs. 6 only in Malawi. This is undoubtedly a reflection of the fact that Benin respondents
had much more prior exposure to agricultural trade than their Malawian counterparts.
The two countries also differ in the extent of associative life. Two thirds of Benin traders are
member of a trader association compared to only 3% of Malawian traders. They have been members for 7
years on average instead of 3 in Malawi, and Benin associations count many more members -- 188 on
average vs. 29 in Malawi. Benin traders  agree to pay  association fees equivalent to  $6 a year, while
Malawian traders pay nothing. The average number of association members who are also trading partners of
the respondent is 34 in Benin compared to 7 only in Malawi. Traders' associations thus play a much more
prominent role in Benin.
Regarding the perceived advantages of being part of an association, by  far the most important
reasons are internal to the traders' comrnunity:  access to market information; mutual insurance; resolution of
commercial disputes.  These reasons account for  55% of the responses in Benin  and 46% in Malawi.
Restricting competition is also  in traders'  mind, especially in Benin: 29% of Benin traders and  16% of
Malawian traders cite various restrictions on  competition (e.g., price fixing, restricting entry, coordinating
purchases and sales) as the main advantage their derive from their membership in traders'  associations.
Dealing with external forces is also an important motivation (e.g., negotiating with government, access to
credit, group orders). It accounts for 15% (Benin) and 35% (Malawi) of the responses.
19Table  8.  Traders'  Social  Capital:  Contacts  and  Associations
Benin  Malawi
Mean  S.d.  Median  N  Mean  S.d. Median  N
% Traders  member  of association  62.4%  0.48  1  659  3.1%  0.17  0  737
Number  of associations  1.2  0.66  1  413  1.1  0.29  1  22
Yearsofmembership  7  8  4  411  3  3  3  22
Annual  membership  feesa  6  33  0  657  0  3  0  736
Number  of members  188  182  120  293  29  30  12  21
Number  of trading  partners  34  90  2  395  7  12  4  22
Advantages  to Membership  (% traders)
Access  to credit  8.53  22.81
Access  to market  information  11.58  15.79
Commercial  contacts  5.48  8.77
Conunercial  dispute  resolution  11.66  15.79
Negotiate  with  government  4.53  10.53
Credibility  3.83  5.26
Protection  against  unfair
competition  0.44  5.26
Agree  on prices  13.84  1.75
Group  orders  1.48  1.75
Mutual  insurance  22.19  0.00
License  fee  3.22  1.75
Coordinate  purchases  and sales  11.40  7.02
Other  1.83  3.51
a  US$  equivalent.  At the time of survey,  exchange  rates  used  are 1  US $= CFA  600 and 1  US $ = MK  45.
4.  Trading  Practices
4.1  Specialization
Specialization by Crop.  Surveyed traders deal primarily in maize, beans, and roots and tubers.
Together, these crops account for 80 to 90% of the main crops traded. None of the surveyed Benin traders
deals in cotton, the main cash crop of the country. Cotton marketing remains entirely in the hands of the
government marketing board. A small number of surveyed Malawian traders deal in tobacco, the principal
export crop. This is the result of a recent liberalization in tobacco marketing. Less than five surveyed traders
sell  chemical inputs  such  as  fertilizer  or  pesticides. Agricultural  inputs  are  typically  sold  either  by
ADMARC or by local branches of large trading operations.
20Table 9.  Agricultural Products Traded by Region in Malawi
(average  shares  of total sales by region)
South  Central  North  Country-wide
Maize  26.00%  30.80%  24.00%  27.40%
Irish potato  3.20%  3.00%  1.30%  2.90%
Sweet potato  9.90%  4.70%  7.30%  7.80%
Cassava  7.80%  3.50%  3.30%  5.70%
Rice  12.30%  1.70%  24.70%  10.20%
Beans/pulses  30.90%  28.00%  24.00%  29.00%
Gr/nuts  7.60%  4.70%  15.30%  7.60%
Tobacco  1.50%  14.40%  5.80%
Chili  0.20%  0.10%
Soyabeans  0.30%  7.90%  3.00%
Total  100.00%  100.00%  100.00%  100.00%
N  593  403  150  1146
Table 10.  Agricultural Products Traded by Region in Benin
(average  shares of total sales by region)
Country-
Region  wide
Atacora  Atlantique  Borgou  Mono  Oueme  Zou
Maize  24.05  38.93  26.36  47.37  45.41  42.13  34.05
Sorghum/millet  20.27  1.34  17.86  2.03  10.22
Small millet  1.37  1.53  1.02  0.90
Rice  9.62  0.67  4.79  0.44  0.51  3.68
Beans/pulses  15.12  9.40  7.41  38.60  17.47  11.17  13.76
Groundnuts  13.75  2.68  3.49  9.65  1.75  11.68  6.81
Bambara groundnuts  0.69  0.67  0.22  0.44  3.05  0.76
Soy  0.67  0.65  2.03  0.56
Manioc  1.72  0.22  0.42
Yarns  2.41  10.07  10.89  3.49  8.63  6.74
Fruit  0.22  0.44  0.14
Tomatoes  0.69  0.67  0.87  3.06  0.51  1.04
Onion  0.34  0.67  1.53  0.44  3.05  1.11
Gombo  0.22  0.07
Chili  4.03  1.74  0.88  4.37  1.74
Other vegetables  0.65  0.21
Other crops  5.84  7.19  5.24  0.51  4.38
Pineapple  0.67  0.07
Cashew nut  1.09  0.44  0.51  0.49
Cassava  1.03  20.81  4.79  3.51  16.16  11.68  8.34
Cossette yams  1.03  4.70  6.75  0.44  1.52  3.13
Cossette manioc  2.06  4.03  1.53  0.44  1.39
Total %  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00
N  351  432  515  242  500  269  2309
21Specialization by Activity. Some traders -- 12% in Benin, 25% in Malawi-sell  products other
than agricultural,  but on average surveyed traders derive 95% of their trade revenue from agricultural trade.
Traders are thus moderately specialized by  sector. But they do not specialize by  crop: two thirds of all
surveyed traders sell more than one agricultural  product; 45% sell more than two. In addition, 23% (Malawi)
to 30% (Benin) of traders have an activity other than trade. In Benin, this  activity is  overwhelmingly
farning;  in Malawi, it is overwhelmingly non-agricultural trade.  Nearly all traders have a principal market
from which they organize their activities. In that market, most of them have a place-stall,  store, shed -- for
their exclusive usage. Three quarters of surveyed traders also operate in other markets-on  average 1.3 to
1.6 purchase markets and 0.3 to 0.5 sales markets. This suggests that traders normally base their operation at
their sales market and purchase from one or two other markets.
Specialization by  Trading  Function.  Traders are  not  fully  specialized  by  function  in  the
marketing chain. Most traders are retailers but half of Benin retailers and a quarter of Malawian retailers
also operate as wholesalers. One sixth of Benin traders and one fourth of Malawian traders specialize in
wholesale only.  Most traders purchase at least some of the quantities they sell directly from farmers. In
fact, 48% and 74% of all retailers in Benin and Malawi, respectively, purchase from farmers. This apparent
lack of functional specialization makes it hazardous to categorize respondents by  their function in the
marketing chain. A very small proportion of surveyed traders also operate as buying or selling agent for
other traders.
22Table 11.  Specialization of Traders in Benin and Malawi
Benin  Malawi
Mean  S.d.  Mean  S.d.
% Traders:
Sell  wholesale  69%  46%  40%  49%
Sell  retail  74%  44%  82%  39%
Purchase  from  farmers  70%  46%  92%  28%
With  a principal  market  98%  13%  100%  0%
With  a place for  exclusive  use  74%  44%  93%  25%
Operate  in other markets  70%  46%  78%  41%
Operate  as buying  agent  6%  24%  2%  14%
Operate  as consignment  agent  2%  12%  1%  10%
Operate  as broker  1%  11%  1%  12%
Sell  products  other  than  agricultural  12%  33%  25%  43%
Number  of other  purchase  markets  1.6  1.3  1.3  1.1
Number  with  exclusive  use  0.4  0.9  0.1  0.3
Number  of other  sales  markets  0.5  0.8  0.3  0.6
Number  with  exclusive  use  0.3  0.6  0.0  0.2
Percentage of revenue from ag. trade  95  15  92  19
4.2  Firm Ownership
The overwhelming majority of independent trading enterprises are held in sole ownership by a local
resident who is also a national of the country studied. Only 30 of the 1400 surveyed traders are foreign
nationals, of which all except one are African.  The owner has typically initiated the business himself or
herself. The overwhelming majority of respondents initiated the enterprise themselves without help from
anyone. Ten to twenty percent of respondents received financial assistance from their family at start-up. For
those respondents who did not start the business themselves, they either inherited it or received it as a gift.
Virtually no one purchased their enterprise, suggesting that goodwill and reputation are not attached to a
specific location, trademark, or business name  (Tadelis, 1999).  A similar survey in Madagascar indeed
showed that African agricultural traders never sell under a trademark or business name (Fafchamps and
Minten, 1999).
23Table 12.  Ownership of Trading Enterprises in Benin and Malawi
Benin  Malawi
Mean  S.d.  Median  Mean  S.d. Median
% of finms  where  manager  is owner  97%  100%
% of finrs where  owned  by:
Local resident  99.7  3.8  100.0  97.2  16.3  100.0
Resident  from  another  town  0.3  3.8  0.0  2.8  16.3  0.0
Other  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Management  of firms:
% where manager in charge  97%  18%  100%  100%  5%  100%
% where  manager  responsible  for  purchases  99%  11%  100%  100%  5%  100%
% where  manager  responsible  for sales  99%  10%  100%  99%  12%  100%
Number  of years  respondent  is in operation  15  9  13  7  6  5
Number  of years  respondent  is in charge  15  9  13  7  6  5
% Firms  where  owner  started  the business  92%  27%  100%  99%  10%  100%
% Managers who worked in another  business  56%  50%  100%  51%  50%  100%
Number  of years  of experience  elsewhere  5  6  4  2  4  0
% Managers  who  worked  as agent  before  15%  36%  0%  3%  18%  0%
Number  of years  of experience  as agent  1  3  0  0  1  0
Characteristics  of firm  owner:
Age  41  11  40  33  9  32
% Women  81%  36%
Years  of trade  experience  of father  4  12  0  6  10  0
Years  of trade  experience  of mother  21  19  25  5  9  0
% Engaged in activity other than trade  30%  23%
4.3  Quantity Inspection: Weights  and measures
Given that only a handful of traders have proper weighting equipment, most trade takes place by
volume. In practice, volume may be a better way of measuring the value of an agricultural product than
weight. Indeed, the weight of a crop can be artificially inflated by adding water. Since excess moisture raises
storage losses, buying by weight generates adverse incentives for farmers not to dry their crops properly
before offering them for sale. Most crops also tend to dessicate over time without losing (much) of their
caloric content. Since water can be added when food is prepared for consumption, this is usually not a
problem-at  least for cereals, pulses, groundnuts, roots and tubers. The same holds for most cash crops. The
main exception is fruits and vegetables. By focusing on volume instead of weight, traders insure themselves
against most storage losses, which are weight losses due to desiccation.
24In the two studied countries, burlap and plastic bags of various sizes serve as measures of volume.
The weight in a given bag obviously varies by crop but, for a given crop, a standardized-size bag can serve
as measurement unit. No less than 11 different types of bag sizes are used in the two studied countries. The
bags are usually named after the amount of maize they would contain-from  20 kg to 200 kg. Benin favors
100kg and 200kg bags; Malawi favors 50kg, 70kg, and 90kg bags. Weight measures such as kg or ton are
used as well, but in less than 10% of all purchases.
In practice, burlap and plastic bags are not perfect measures of volume. The first reason is that
burlap bags tend to loosen over time so that older bags tend to contain more than new ones. The second
reason is that the volume contained in a bag varies with the way it is filled and sealed. Measures are thus
somewhat subjective in the sense that they depend on the state of the traders' bags and on the way they are
filled. This subjectivity may explain why traders nearly always transfer purchased goods from the bags of
the seller to their own bags. This is a time-consuming  and cumbersome process, but it may be essential to an
assessment of volume by the buyer. It also enables the buyer to assess the quality of the product since, in the
transfer process, what was at the bottom of the seller's bag ends at the top of the buyer's.
4.4  Quality Inspection
We begin by noting that surveyed traders trade in non-standardized products.  By their own account,
three quarters of surveyed traders deal in products with multiple varieties. Two third  also state that the
product they sell varies by quality. Variation in variety and quality is associated with price differences. The
coefficient of variation of prices due to quality and variety differences is 0.13 in Benin and 0.10 in Malawi
(median 0.12 and 0.07). This means that a trader could lose most of his or her margin by purchasing a
product of poor quality or of the wrong variety. Assessment of the product is thus essential.
Direct inspection is the only method by which surveyed traders assess quality. Only a handful of
traders (10 out of more than  2000 responses) declare relying on the supplier to identify the variety and
assess the quality. Only one respondent stated that he relies on the package. This finding is similar to those
reported by Fafchamps and Minten (1999) for Madagascar. It stands in contrast with results reported by
25Tripp and Pal (1998) regarding agricultural seeds in India. Inspecting each purchased load for quality is
likely to be time-consuming. Since it requires experience and familiarity, it may be hazardous to delegate
this function to inexperienced or unmotivated employees. Quality control is thus likely to represent a major
obstacle on business expansion.
4.5  Relationships with suppliers and clients
Another important dimension of trade as a business is the relationships traders have with their
suppliers and clients.  The overwhelming majority of surveyed traders have regular clients and suppliers. The
number of regulars is fairly large: 6.5 regular suppliers and 7 clients in Benin; 1  1 suppliers and 15 clients in
Malawi. Respondents do  close to half of their business with these few individuals. Trade  is thus very
personalized. Networks of traders play an important  role in the movement of agricultural products.
As  far  as the  composition of  these  networks is  concerned,  ethnic  concentration  appears less
prevalent than often assumed  (Fafchamps, 1999). Less than half the regular suppliers and clients are from
the same ethnic  group or religion as the respondent. Only  a  tiny proportion of regulars are relatives.
Contrary to what is claimed by Granovetter (1995) regarding immigrant business networks in the U.S.,
business relationships among African traders are not primarily built on the family. (Fafchamps and Minten,
2000)
Respondents meet outside business with about a quarter of their regular suppliers and clients in
Benin, but only 8 to 15% of them in Malawi. Social interaction is primarily through business. Some 12% of
Benin suppliers and clients sell exclusively to or buy exclusively from the respondent. The equivalent figure
for Malawi is 23%. In contrast, respondents nearly never see themselves as bound to buy only from or sell
only to regulars.
26Table 13.  Traders' Relationships  with Regular Partners in Benin and Malawi
Benin  Malawi
Suppliers  Clients  Suppliers  Clients
% Traders that have regular clients or suppliers  79%  69%  74%  88%
% Regulars of same origin  90%  87%  67%  92%
% Regulars of same ethic group  47%  49%  41%  45%
% Regulars of same religion  43%  40%  29%  36%
% Regulars with whom meet socially  26%  28%  8%  15%
% Regulars that are close relatives  5%  6%  4%  7%
% Regulars that have exclusive relations  12%  12%  22%  23%
% Traders can sell or buy with non-regulars  99%  99%  99%  99%
Number of regulars in main market  2.7 (6.1)  6.5 (10.1)  5(15)  14(23)
Number of regulars in other markets  3.9 (6.4)  0.8 (4.0)  6 (15)  1 (11)
% of total trade with regulars  51 (33)  37 (32)  45 (34)  50 (29)
4.6  Payment Methods and Trade Credit
Regarding  transaction  methods,  payment  in  cash  is  universal.  Payment  in  foreign  currency  or  in
kind  occurs  very  occasionally.  Payment  by  check  is  unheard  of,  indicating  the  lack  of  sophistication  of
banking  methods  by traders  and also perhaps  the lack of trust among  traders.
Table 14.  Payment Methods in Agricultural Trading in Benin and Malawi
Benin  Malawi
Mean  S.d.  N  Mean  S.d.  N
Of transactions with suppliers:
% Cash, local currency  99.5  5.1  662  99.2  6.4  738
% Other currency  0.5  5.1  662  0.4  5.5  738
% Wire transfer  0.0  0.0  662  0.0  0.3  738
% Check  0.0  0.0  662  0.0  0.0  738
% In kind  0.0  0.0  662  0.4  3.2  738
Of transactions with clients:
% Cash, local currency  99.9  1.9  660  98.1  11.6  738
% Other currency  0.1  1.6  660  0.5  6.3  738
% Wire transfer  0.0  1.2  660  0.0  0.0  738
% Check  0.0  0.0  660  1.3  9.5  738
%Inkind  0.0  0.0  660  0.1  0.9  738
27Supplier credit is moderately common in Benin but fairly rare in Malawi. In Benin, respondents
state that close to one quarter of their purchases and sales are made on credit. Sixty percent of respondents
claim to be given credit by at least some of their suppliers. Three quarters of them extend credit to at least
some of their clients. Corresponding numbers in Malawi are much lower: purchases on credit account for
only 3% of total purchases; credit sales amount to only 11% of all sales. Some 85% of Malawian traders
claim to never receive credit from suppliers; one third never grant any credit to clients.
Table 15.  Incidence of Trade Credit and Advance Payments to Farmers
Benin  Malawi
Mean  S.d.  Median  N  Mean  S.d. Median  N
Of purchases  from suppliers:
% Credit  23  26  20  662  3  11  0  737
%Payment  upon  delivery  74  27  80  662  95  13  100  737
%Advance  payment  4  9  0  662  2  7  0  737
Of sales  to clients:
% Credit  23  24  20  660  11  14  5  738
% Payment  upon  delivery  76  24  80  660  87  19  90  738
%Advance  payment  0  4  0  660  0  3  0  738
Advances  to Farmers
% Traders  buy  with advance  24  654
Account  payable:a
Currently  due  24  116  0  486  0  4  0  731
Maximum  due  310  855  33  663  8  46  0  738
Account  receivable:
Currently  due  1  10  0  280  5  47  0  734
Maximum  due  69  385  0  663  32  265  0  738
a  US$  equivalent.  At the time  of survey,  exchange  rates  used are I US $=  CFA 600  and 1  US $ =  MK  45.
Outstanding balances on trade  credit are very small:  $24 in Benin, nothing in Malawi. This is
probably because trade credit is of very short duration: 6 to 8 days on average with suppliers, 9 to 11 days
on average with clients. In the overwhelming majority of cases, traders do not charge a different price if they
sell cash  or on  credit.  Discussions with respondents suggest  that  sales  on  credit  correspond to  large
quantities. Credit seems to be used to incite the buyer to buy more. In this context, waiving interest on trade
credit is like offering a quantity discount.
28Some traders  also extend credit  to farmers: 25% of traders in Benin, less than 10% in Malawi.
Purchases with advance payment to farmers represent a minute proportion of total purchases -- 4% in Benin,
2% in Malawi. Crop prices are either set in advance (40% of the cases in Benin, 75% in Malawi) or set equal
to the market price at the time of delivery. Prices are negotiated at delivery only in a handful of cases. Only
in 16 to 24% of the cases do credit and cash differ. When they do, median cash prices are 13% higher than
credit prices. We therefore find little evidence that advances to farmers hide  'exploitative'  practices by
traders (Crow and Murshid 1994).
Table 16.  Contractual Terms of Trade Credit and Advance Payments
Benin
Mean  S.d.  Min.  Max.  Median  N
Credit  from  suppliers
Days  to pay  8.13  6.32  2.00  100.00  7.00  379
% Traders  pay different  price  5.9  409
% Credit  premium  8.06  24
Credit  to clients
Days  to  pay  9.09  13.48  1.00  279.00  7.00  469
% Traders  pay  different  price  7.8  498
% Credit  premium  6.06  40
Advance  payment  to farmers
Days  to pay  13.70  19.55  2.00  90.00  7.00  20
% Traders  pay  different  price  16  151
Determination  of price
% Market  price at delivery  58  157
% Price  set forward  40  157
% Advance  discount  12.50  28
Malawi
Mean  S.d.  Min.  Max.  Median  N
Credit  from  suppliers
Days  to pay  5.60  4.53  1.00  30.00  5.00  106
% Traders  pay different  price  11  115
% Credit  prernium  25.00  13
Credit  to clients
Days  to pay  10.97  11.32  1.00  60.00  7.00  423
% Traders  pay different  price  14  511
% Credit  premium  12.28  73
Advances  to farmers
Days  to pay  14.38  22.22  1.00  90.00  5.00  52
% Traders  pay different  price  0.24  0.43  0.00  1.00  0.00  67
Determination  of price
% market  price  at delivery  19  69
% price set forward  75  69
% Advance  discount  0.00
29Credit duration is a bit longer than with traders -- 14 days on average with a median of 7 days-but
it is certainly shorter than the agricultural season. Surveyed traders therefore are not in the business of
financing agricultural production. Advances to farmers appear like a way for traders to secure sufficient
quantities and plan their activities from one week to another.
4.7  Use of Intermediaries
Intermediaries-brokers,  buying agents, consignment agents-are  a substitute for networks: instead
of knowing lots of potential buyers, a trader might choose to know a single agent who sells to all of them.
To investigate these  issues,  data were  collected  on the  use  of intermediaries.  Results  indicate that
intermediaries are much more frequently used in Benin than in Malawi: 31% of Benin traders use buying
agents; 26% use consignment agents. The corresponding numbers are 6% and 0% in Malawi. The only
category of intermediaries where the two countries are more or less similar is brokers: 8% of Benin traders
use them, vs. 3% of Malawian traders. Some 70% of Benin traders also use an intermediate category called
'apprentice'.  Although not strictly speaking agents, apprentices straddle across the employee and  agent
category. In practice they are encouraged to use their initiative and are used as selling agents. In two third of
the cases, apprentices are close relatives. On average Benin traders deal with 2 such apprentices.
Similar figures arise if we focus on the last purchase only. We find that 31% of Benin traders used
an agent to purchase agricultural products vs. only 3% of Malawian respondents. On the selling side, 27% of
Benin traders used an agent vs. 3% in Malawi. In Benin, the selling agent is half the time a broker, half the
time an apprentice.
The total number of agents used also varies significantly across the two countries, with a much
larger number of agents-especially  buying agents and apprentices (selling agents) -- used in Benin and a
longer period of acquaintance -- 2.2 years for buying agents in Benin vs. 1 month in Malawi.  Malawian
agents are portrayed as rather similar to the respondent in terms of origin, ethnicity, and religion. Social
interaction outside business is also more likely than in Benin, and agent are more likely to be close relatives
30and to operate exclusively for the respondent. In contrast, Benin agents appear to be as different from the
respondent as are regular clients and suppliers.
From this information, we conclude that the use of intermediaries is much more prevalent in Benin
and that agents are more easily trusted. In contrast, Malawian respondents deal with few agents and do so
only sporadically. When they do, the agent is someone they can identify with more easily than with the
general trader population.
Table 17.  Traders' Use of Intermediaries in Benin and Malawi
Benin  Malawi
Buying  Broker  Consign.  Buying  Broker  Consign.
agent  agent  agent  agent
% Traders  with  at least  one  agent  31%  8%  26%  6%  3%  0%
Average  number  of agents  1.79  0.29  0.37  0.17  0.09  0.01
Average  years  worked  together  2.22  0.49  2.23  0.15  0.05  0.01
% Traders  with  agents:
Of  same  origin  85%  85%  78%  96%  100%  100%
Of same  ednic group  42%  41%  36%  76%  69%  100%
Of  same  religion  37%  36%  43%  60%  40%  100%
With  whom  meet  socially  27%  44%  35%  43%  34%  43%
Who are close  relatives  7%  6%  4%  20%  9%  14%
Who  are exclusive  agents  23%  13%  13%  56%  22%  100%
4.8  Information gathering and search
Next we examine how traders collect information about prices and market conditions and search for
suppliers and  clients. The  average agricultural trader  follows  (a  little over)  two  agricultural products
regularly. He or she also follows regularly two supply markets and (a little over) one sales market. This is
consistent with the observed pattern by which most surveyed traders are located in their sales market and
source their products from a small number of nearly supply markets.
Surveyed traders regularly consult an  average of 3 people in Benin -- 7 people in Malawi-to
collect information about prices. More people are consulted on the trader's main market (which is typically a
sales market) than on other markets (which are typically supply sources). This is probably because the trader
31spends more time on his main sales market. Tracking the ongoing selling price closely is essential to get the
highest possible margin without losing customers. An average of (a little over) one worker participate to the
collection of price information, which imply that most employees of the trading enterprise are involved in
one way or another in closely monitoring prices.  In 54% of cases, Benin traders estimate that so doing they
are able to collect reliable information about ongoing prices on supply markets without having to visit them;
78% of Malawian traders make the same claim.
We asked respondents to report the main source of information on prices in their main market and
other markets. Talking to other traders is by far the major source of information on prices either in one's
own market or on other markets: 64% of Benin traders and 84% of Malawian traders report conversations
with other traders, including clients and suppliers, as their main source of information about prices in their
home market. Surprisingly, intermediaries are hardly ever mentioned. Surveyed  traders do not appear to rely
on agents to quote reliable prices. In Malawi, 7% of respondents respond that they do not need to collect
information because they set their own price.
Regarding other markets, talking to other traders is again the main source of information. Suppliers
are reported as a major source of information by one third of Malawian traders. This is a priori surprising
since  suppliers have an  incentive to  overestimate the price.  The radio  is  cited  as  a  main  source of
information by 8% of Malawian traders. One quarter of Benin traders and ten percent of Malawian traders
rely on personal observation-  which means that they physically visit the market, eavesdrop, and act as a
potential customer to get price quotes.
Keeping in touch with other markets, however, takes a bit more effort than just talking with a few
traders. One important factor in this state of affairs is the extremely low usage of telephones: agricultural
traders place, on average, 4 to 8 business-related calls a year. This is an extremely low frequency that is
likely to change as cellular phones become more widely available in Africa.
Personal visits to other purchase and sales markets make up for lack of telephone. Surveyed traders
make an average of 250 trips a year to purchase and sales markets in Benin and 92 trips a year in Malawi.
The corresponding medians are 133 (Benin) and 52 (Malawi). In Benin, most trips are to sales market; in
32Malawi,  three  quarters  of the  trips  are  to supply markets.  As mentioned  earlier,  the cumulated  annual cost
of these trips is not negligible  and it represents  a major cost for traders.
The high frequency  of travel means that traders  are absent quite often from their  main market.  Given
that they  do not use telephones,  they cannot  easily keep  in touch with  conditions  in their  main market while
they  are  away.  The  need  to  travel  frequently  to  supply  markets  probably  explains  why  traders  source
products  primarily  from nearby  markets.
Table  18.  Search  Behavior  of Traders  in Benin  and Malawi
Benin  Malawi
Mean  S.d.  N  Mean  S.d.  N
Information collection
Number of products followed  2.3  1.6  662  2.1  1.1  738
Number of supply markets followed  2.0  1.7  662  2.1  1.2  738
Number of sales markets followed  1.2  0.5  660  1.3  0.8  738
Number of people consulted in own market  1.8  1.6  651  5.3  6.2  737
Number of people consulted in other markets  1.5  2.0  647  2.0  3.1  737
Number of employees who collect price
information  1.1  2.1  656  1.2  0.9  733
% Traders who obtain reliable information
without visit  54%  0  502  78%  0  593
Cost of search
Number of phone calls per year  4  32  606  8  76  685
Number of trips to purchase markets per yr.  107  439  642  74  133  710
Cost of trips to purchase markets ($/yr)  297  1421  537  443  1348  564
Number of trips to sales market per year  145  698  627  25  75  623
Cost of trips to sales markets ($/yr)  177  805  414  1219  4843  219
334.9  Contractual performance
Respondents  were  asked  to  report  the  number  of  cases  of  contract  non-performance  they
encountered in the year preceding the survey. Results indicate a much higher incidence of contractual non-
performance in Malawi than in Benin. In Benin, traders only report a  handful of cases of bad quality,
disagreement over measures, or ex post price renegotiation with suppliers. In contrast, Malawian traders
report close to 200 such occurrences per year-roughly  6% of purchases. Because Malawian traders are
more likely to place orders with suppliers, they  are also more likely to encounter late or non-delivery
problems. In fact, the probability of non-performance appears to be quite high on orders. Given that the
placement of orders is more likely when the market is tight, this is hardly surprising. But it serves as a
reminder that surveyed traders do not conceive contracts as binding.
The two countries are more similar on the selling side, although the frequency of payment problems
is about twice as high in Malawi than in Benin. Malawian traders are also much more likely to mention
efforts by clients to renegotiate prices ex post. The frequency of payment problems is very low in both
countries-of  the order of 0.5 to 0.6%. Surveyed traders have on average one person in the firm dealing with
debt collection. The fear to lose one's reputation might be a deterrent to non-payment: 53% of Benin traders
and 70% of Malawian traders state that other suppliers would get to know if a client would not pay the
respondent.
34Table 19.  Contract  Enforcement  and Commercial  Disputes  in Benin  and Malawi
Benin  Malawi
Mean  S.d.  N  Mean  S.d.  N
Problems  with suppliers (% of traders):
Bad quality  3%  663  41%  736
Disagreement  over measuring  7%  663  35%  733
Renegotiate price  12%  662  25%  731
Cases of bad quality per year  0.3  2.8  663  63.9  340.9  736
Cases of measuring dispute per year  2.3  12.4  662  99.5  410.9  733
Cases of price renegotiation per year  1.6  6.0  657  45.7  217.5  731
Orders  with Suppliers
% Traders who place orders  6%  658  32%  735
% Total purchases on order  1.2  6.4  655  6.3  12.7  733
Number suppliers from whom order  0.0  0.4  656  0.7  3.9  732
% Traders with late delivery problems  18%  50  41%  296
% Traders with problerns of partial delivery  20%  50  31%  296
% Traders with problems of no delivery  16%  50  27%  295
Cases of late delivery per year  5.0  20.8  50  37.5  197.5  296
Cases of partial delivery per year  3.1  9.3  50  19.0  57.7  296
Cases of no delivery  per year  0.3  0.8  50  31.3  148.0  294
Problems with clients (% of traders):
Late payment  24%  660  42%  734
Partial payment  21%  660  34%  733
No payment  20%  660  25%  733
Renegotiate price  5%  658  20%  731
Cases of late paymentper  year  10.8  34.1  656  15.2  36.5  734
Cases of partial payment per year  9.8  62.2  656  14.9  71.8  733
Cases of no payment per year  0.9  3.4  659  7.1  62.4  732
Cases of price renegotiation per year  0.4  2.1  655  116.0  506.7  730
Number clients who order  0.1  0.6  662  0.5  1.6  722
Number of sales  3102  4433  198  7898  9140  734
% Traders for whom others will find out if
they encounter non payment problems  53%  619  70%  734
Number of employees dealing with debt
collection  1.1  1.0  641  0.7  0.6  682
354.10  Protection ofproperty
We end this section with a short description of how surveyed traders protect their property. In the
year preceding the survey, 16% of Benin traders and 33% of Malawian traders were victims of theft. This is
higher than the incidence of theft reported in Fafchamps and Minten (2001b) for Madagascar. The value of
stolen property was fairly low, however:  $22 per year on average. Some traders, however, incurred much
higher losses-of  the order of  $2500 in each country.
Few  respondents directly blame employees for  the thefts, but only  62% of Benin traders  are
confident that employees were not involved (72% in Malawi). Contrary to what Fafchamps and Minten
(2001b) report for Madagascar, fear of pilferage does not discourage traders from hiring employees: only
3% of Benin respondents and  11% of Malawian respondents state they refrain  from hiring additional
employees for fear of theft.
The methods most commonly used to protect one's property are to lock it at night (75% of those
who store in Benin, 87% in Malawi), hire a guard (40% and 28% respectively) and sleep on the premises
(19% and 48% respectively). For those who transport, some protection is occasionally sought as well: some
traders travel in convoy (10% in Benin, 19% in Malawi); some avoid particular routes (8% in Benin, 17% in
Malawi); and some hire guards during transport (4% and  17%). Protection during transport thus appears
slightly more problematic in Malawi, possibly because the country is less densely populated and ambush is
easier to organize.
36Table 20.  Methods of Protecting Commercial Property in Benin and Malawi
Benin  Malawi
Mean  S.d.  N  Mean  S.d.  N
Incidence  of Theft
Victim of theft  16%  662  33%  730
Employees  involved  in theft  5%  9%
Value  of stolen  property  (%of sales)  0.59  4.50  627  0.28  1.83  683
Methods  to Protect  Property  (%  Traders)
Avoid  hiring  employees  3%  660  11%  735
Goods  kept  under  lock  65%  639  82%  735
Guard  on premises  34%  639  26%  735
Sleep  on premises  15%  639  45%  735
Travel  in convoy  8%  639  13%  735
Avoid  certain  routes  7%  639  13%  735
Hire  guard  during  tranport  3%  639  12%  735
5.  Commercial Activities
In the following two sections, we compare commercial activities and market performance of traders
across categories, or terciles, of firm assets-  namely working capital, human capital, and social capital-  as
well as gender. We begin with a brief discussion of the asset categories.  In the case of working capital, we
noted earlier that working capital held by individual traders was extremely skewed in both countries,
particularly in Benin, where working capital ranges from $0 to $217,000, and less so in Malawi, where it
ranges from $0 to $34,100. Thus, in Benin, the bottom tercile has up to $167 in working capital, while the
second tercile has between $167 and $667 in working capital. The top tercile of working capital has a very
broad range, from $667 to the maximum, $217,000, working capital. In contrast, traders' working capital
appears to be more widely distributed in Malawi. Thus, the bottom tercile has up to $1900 in working
capital, while the middle tercile has a range between $1900 and $11,300. The top third has a range from
$11,300 to $34,100.
37Unlike working capital, the amount of human resources employed by traders does not vary
significantly  within the sample.  In both countries, the majority of trading firms employ one employee  (44%
of the sample in Benin and 72% in Malawi), suggesting  that trading firms remain micro-enterprises. In the
top third of firms in Benin, the number of employees varies from 2 to 14, with the exception of 4 firms with
a greater  number of employees (up to a maximum of 67 employees). In Malawi, only 11  % of firms have
more than 2 employees, up to a maximum of 22 employees.
In terms of social capital, defined as the number of trading contacts known by each respondent,
traders in both countries have quite similar patterns. The 66 h percentile is 33 and 36 contacts in Benin and
Malawi, respectively. The top third has a considerably  broader range, up to 530 contacts in Benin and 244
contacts in Malawi.
S.1  Annual  Sales
Overall, median sales do not differ much across the two countries, with the median trader selling
$5,300 to  $6,700 worth of  merchandise per year.  These differences across countries mask dramatic
variation in volume of activity within each country: the Gini coefficient of the total value of annual sales is
0.60 in Benin and 0.38 in Malawi. In both countries, the largest surveyed trader had sales of 2.6 to 2.8
million dollars a year while 17% of the sample sold less than $1000 of merchandise in a year.  Viewing
median sales activity by working capital terciles reveals that the top tercile of traders have 11-13 times more
sales than the bottom tercile and 4-5 times more than the middle tercile in both countries.
In sharp contrast, human resources do not appear to have as important returns in terms of sales
activity in Benin.  Median sales in the top human resource tercile are just 4 times higher than the bottom
tercile and slightly more than twice as high as the middle tercile.  In Malawi, where 72% of firms have 1
employee, firns  with more than  I employee have 4-5 times higher median sales.  A similar pattern also
exists for social capital in both countries, where the top tercile only has 2-3 times more sales than the bottom
38terciles.  These findings suggest that working capital is a more determinant factor in traders' activities than
either human or social capital.
Finally, gender appears to have a significant impact on sales activity, such that male traders, who
represent only 20% of the sample in Benin, have median sales less than 4 times that of female traders and
nearly 3 times higher in Malawi, where female traders represent 35% of the sample.
Table 21.  Value of Annual Sales (US$) by Firm Assets in Benin and MalawiA
Benin  Malawi
Working  Capital  Mean  S.d.  Median  N  Working  Capital  Mean  S.d.  Median  N
<$167  6730.17  33769.20  1256.20  156  <  $78  4587.98  10152.16  2189.39  193
$167-$667  11584.85  22628.95  3315.41  226  $78 -$244  9324.91  13745.82  5762.43  201
>=$667  49678.56  192965.70  16227.29  201  >= $244  111471.30  292941.00  25222.22  204
Human  Capital  Human  Capital
<-1  employee  20553.89  148507.28  2743.84  324  0- 1 employee  13227.18  43077.18  4584.099  427
1  -2 employees 16250.84  26356.02  4942.71 138  > I emnployee  120549.4  321935.10 20373.28 163
> 2 ernployees  36126.53  72551.90 12296.52 137
Social  Capital  Social  Capital
<  10  7648.122  12362.21  2402.91  165  <15  23437.30  85306.21  3830.24  185
10-33  26843.05  174167.70  4370.39  234  15-36  56147.91  243645.00  6556.48  213
>= 33  30734.48  63358.51  9800.92  205  >= 36  46022.60  157136.00  8773.51  200
Gender  Gender
Male  38804.14  73557.73  14402.37  120  Male  57823.06  214243.50  8781.95  387
Female  18983.95  122557.00  3724.44  486  Femnale  14798.12  68196.87  3177.16  211
Total  22908.74  114750.80  5366.64 606  Total  42642.02  178148.70  6579.04 598
a  US$ equivalent. At the  time of survey,  exchange  rates  used are I US $= CFA 600  and  I US $ = MK 45.
5.2  Transport:  Arbitrage over Space
Transport Practices and Rates.  One fifth of surveyed traders do not undertake any transport, by
which they mean that they buy and sell from the same market. The others transport products across markets,
nearly always with an extemal transporter.
Most transport (86%) takes place in trucks. Half of these trucks are small pick-ups. Some 13% of all
transport takes place with non-motorized means of transport such as handcarts and oxcarts. Respondent
39traders in either of the countries studied do not use train transport.  Measured in dollars per ton per kIn,
transport costs  average  $0.43 and  $0.70  in Benin and  Malawi, respectively. Transport charges vary
dramatically by mode of transport, however. Non-motorized transport costs on average  $1.78 (Benin) and
$1.20 (Malawi).  In contrast, motorized transport costs $0.28 and  $0.63 in Benin and Malawi, respectively.
Regressing transport costs on distance and means of transport indicates that truck transportation  has
a higher fixed cost but lower cost per km.  Consistent with expectations, we find that small trucks are
significantly more expensive than large trucks, but the difference is not large.  Non-motorized transport is
use primarily on  short distances --  4km on average in Benin,  12km in Malawi. Large trucks are used
primarily on  long distances --  120km in Malawi, 160km in Benin. Pick-up trucks  are used on  medium
distances, e.g., 40 to 70km.
Taken  together,  these  features  suggest  that transport  follows  some  economic  rationale. The
quantitative  importance of short hauls, small trucks, and non-motorized transport probably contribute to high
marketing costs.  Comparing between Benin and Malawi, transported distances appear slightly higher in
Benin, and transport rates per ton are lower, varying between $1  1/ton to $14/ton in Benin, compared to $16
to $20/ton in Malawi.  Further indication that the transport sector is more competitive in Benin is that the
variation between the peak transport rate in the marketing year along selected routes and the prevailing rate
at the time of the survey is lower in Benin, with an 3-11% increase in the peak season compared to a 16-
18% increase in Malawi.  These figures suggest that there may less congestion in the transport system in
Benin, while transport may be more of a constraint in the peak transport period in Malawi.
40Table 22.  Transport Practices and Means
Benin  Malawi
N % Traders  N % Traders
Transport Activity  No transport  124  19%  150  20%
Only with own vehicle  36  5%  14  2%
Only with transporter  502  76%  532  72%
With own vehicle and transporter  0%  39  5%
Total  662  735
Means of Transport
foot  4  1%  7  1%
bicycle  0%  53  9%
handcart  74  14%  5  1%
oxcart  2  0%  16  3%
motorbike  11  2%  0%
I tontruck  213  41%  243  42%
7 ton truck  178  34%  189  32%
large truck  37  7%  43  7%
train  0%  4  1%
other  2  0%  22  4%
Total  521  582
Table 23.  Transported Distances and Rates on Selected Routes
Benin
Kilometers  $/tona  Peak rate ratio  N
Mean  S.d.  Mean  S.d.
Route 1  64.05  114.67  11.23  9.82  1.11  504
Route 2  40.74  95.96  13.65  12.73  1.11  275
Route 3  17.08  64.73  12.15  7.82  1.03  119
Malawi
Kilometers  $/tona  Peak rate ratio  N
Mean  S.d.  Mean  S.d.
Route 1  55.27  80.20  16.04  15.62  1.18  563
Route 2  34.95  69.71  19.91  28.62  1.16  337
Route3  13.10  50.64  20.06  41.25  1.17  122
a  At the time of survey, exchange rates used are I US $= CFA 600 and I US $ = MK 45.
41Transport in the Last Transaction.  Information was collected on the last completed transaction
undertaken by respondents. A 'transaction' is essentially a purchase of goods that is assembled by the trader
in the supply market, transported to the sales market, and sold over a period of time. The average distance
between the purchase and sale market varies between 53km in Malawi and 69km in Benin. Median distances
are much shorter, however -- 15km in Malawi and 23km in Benin. This means that most agricultural traders
only travel very short distances to their supply market.
Viewed by  firns,  traders  in the lowest working capital terciles in  both countries are typically
retailers who do not engage in any transport.  However, the analysis of the middle and top terciles of
working capital, human resources, and social capital reveals that firm  assets do  not appear to  greatly
influence the distances traded.  Similarly, while male traders do generally trade across greater distances in
both countries, the median distances are not widely divergent between the two groups.
Table 24.  Transported Distance (kms) on Last Transaction by Firm Assets
Benin  Malawi
Mean  S.d.  Median  N  Mean  S.d. Median  N
Working  Capital
<$167  22.51  67.19  0.00  170  < $78  28.22  46.65  0.00  230
$167-$667  55.61  80.55  25.00  229  $78 - $244  61.67  95.06  21.50  208
>= $667  130.46  260.53  51.50  192  >= $244  73.09  95.87  45.00  204
Human  Capital
<=1 employee  41.39  83.20  11.50  342  0-1 employee  52.37  86.95  10.00  468
1 - 2 employees  93.90  285.35  35.50  130  >1 employee  54.97  69.92  30.00  166
> 2 employees 108.21  141.96  53.00  135
Social Capital
< 10  29.40  60.62  11.00  185  < 15  45.32  76.73  2.00  205
10 - 33  59.36  213.74  12.00  227  15 -36  53.15  91.64  14.00  226
>=33  115.05  152.75  53.00  200  >=36  61.26  80.37  40.00  211
Gender
Male  110.32  146.89  52.00  121  Male  56.03  83.63  20.00  397
Female  58.72  166.32  18.00  493  Female  48.92  83.39  10.00  245
Total  68.89  163.85  23.00  614  Total  53.31  83.54  15.00  642
425.3  Storage: Arbitrage over Time
Most surveyed traders do not stock products. They typically purchase a load and hold onto it until it
is sold, after which they visit their sale market to replenish their stock. Contrary to common beliefs, the great
majority of traders do not undertake speculative or seasonal storage. The average stock held is a tiny fraction
of annual sales  -- of the order of 1% on average.
There is, however, a small minority of traders who are involved in arbitrage across time. Some 10%
of traders hold stocks for over a month. To estimate returns to storage, we regressed the logarithm of the
ratio of selling price over buying price on time and crop specific dummies. This yields an estimate of the
increase in gross margin associated with storage. Results suggest that the return to an additional day of
storage is 0.25% in Malawi and 0.05% in Benin. These figures, compounded on a daily basis to keep up
with the estimation method, are equivalent to a return rate of 25% (Malawi) and 4% (Benin) on 90 day
storage'.  These results indicate that average returns to storage are not as large as often reported in the
popular press, which is probably why so few traders bother to stock over long periods. Storage is also a very
risky activity  since realized returns  can vary widely around these expected returns. Larger returns can
probably be achieved by rotating one's working capital faster instead of immobilizing it in idle stocks.
1  Simnilar  results  are obtained  with  a linear  specification.  A median  regression  also yield similar  results. The
contrast  between  the two countries  may be due to the fact  that  Benin  has two rainy  seasons. Consequently,  the supply
of food  is more  evenly  distributed  over  the entire  year.
43Table 25.  Storage Practices
Benin  Malawi
Mean  S.d.  N  Mean  S.d.  N
% Traders that trade at residence  59%  661  35%  738
% Traders that store at residence  47%  659  54%  737
Storage capacity at residence (kgs)  3836  10497  658  5790  35873  733
% Traders that Store outside home  24%  649  39%  736
Storage capacity outside of residence (kgs)  3253  9715  649  6233  38269  728
% Traders with Access to collective storage  57%  658  32%  735
Cost of collective storage  0.26  0.28  139  3.12  8.11  153
% Traders that own residence  24%  660  75%  738
Value of residence  13689  43283  141  1039  3223  554
% Traders  that  owned  residence  a year  ago  98%  155  96%  560
a US$ per ton per day. At the time of survey, exchange rates were 1 US $= CFA 600 and I US $ = MK 45.
Not all quantities purchased had been sold by the time of the survey. On average, surveyed traders
had sold 85 to 90% of the quantities purchased by the time of the interview and had, on average, recouped
the value of the purchased goods. The number of days elapsed since the last purchase varied significantly
between the two countries, however: 22 days on average in Benin vs. 8 in Malawi (t value of 9.6). Medians
were sizably lower -- 8 and 3 days respectively. Ninety percent of surveyed traders keep goods for less than
a month. This suggests that storage is concentrated in the hands of a few traders. The majority of traders
keep the products for a short period only, typically the time it takes to sell the batch of purchased goods.
A comparison of storage behavior across the various categories of assets reveals that there is little
variation among asset groups. Indeed, in the case of human resources and social capital in Benin, traders in
the lowest terciles have the highest days of storage.  A possible explanation for this may be that the less
endowed traders are typically retailers, whose main business is transforming the good from a larger lot size
to smaller transaction units (eg., from 100 kg bags to under  1 kg traditional units).  Thus, these traders
require a longer period of time to complete a transaction according to the above definition, in which the total
quantity purchased at one time is liquidated.
44Table 26.  Storage Days on Last Transaction  by Firm Assets
Benin  Malawi
Mean  S.d.  Median  N  Mean  S.d. Median  N
Working Capital
<$167  17.36  28.85  7.00  169  < $78  3.54  4.90  2.00  245
$167-$667  23.64  41.10  8.00  242  $78 - $244  7.08  12.09  3.00  245
>= $667  23.61  32.69  10.00  210  >= $244  13.29  21.69  6.00  246
Human Capital
<-1 employee  24.43  40.32  8.00  349  0-1 employee  6.40  13.79  2.00  523
1 -2 employees  13.35  19.62  7.00  147  >1 employee  12.03  17.81  6.00  204
> 2 employees  23.25  31.46  10.00  140
Social Capital
< 10  29.97  33.00  20.00  179  < 15  6.84  14.31  2.00  219
10 -33  17.79  34.96  7.00  242  15 -36  8.60  14.63  3.00  269
>= 33  19.18  35.69  7.00  219  >= 36  8.30  16.38  3.00  248
Gender
Male  26.98  41.89  7.00  121  Male  9.02  15.82  3.00  468
Female  20.39  33.08  8.00  521  Female  6.15  13.73  2.00  268
Total  21.63  34.97  8.00  642  Total  7.98  15.15  3.00  736
S.4  Arbitrage over Transacdon Size
Evidence from the last transaction reveals that, on average, the load is purchased from 5 different
suppliers in Benin --  15 in Malawi. The load is then sold to an average of  10 (Benin) to 50  (Malawi)
different clients. In two third of the cases, the trader himself or herself traveled to the supply market or
markets to  oversee the purchase. In nearly  all  cases, the respondent  supplies his  or  her  own bags or
containers at the time of purchase, i.e., agricultural products are transferred from the seller's to the buyer's
bags.
The ratio of the number of clients to the number of suppliers indicates whether the trader is engaged
in arbitrage across form: buying in large quantities from a few suppliers and selling in small quantities to a
large  number  of buyers.  The  data  reveal  that  traders  in  Malawi  appear  to  be  more  engaged  in
transformation to retail quantities than traders in Benin.  Viewed by  asset category, traders  with larger
financial endowments carry out less arbitrage over transaction size than smaller traders.  The same is true
for traders with higher social capital. In terms of human capital, given that transforming goods from larger
45to smaller transaction sizes requires human resources and capital, it appears that the lowest tercile in Benin
are less involved in this activity than the other terciles.
Table 27.  Change in Transaction Sizea  by Firm Assets
Benin  Malawi
Terciles  Mean  S.d.  N  Terciles  Mean  S.d..  N
Working  capital
<$167  8.03  9.51  72  < $78  25.62  34.90  245
$167-$667  4.10  7.63  113  $78  - $244  34.70  50.71  245
>= $667  2.80  5.28  125  >= $244  15.82  47.33  244
Human  resources
<1 employee  1.93  2.66  36  0- 1  employee  28.03  43.52  523
I - 2 employees  6.32  9.02  114  > I employee  19.24  50.29  202
> 2 employees  3.90  6.92  162  Total  25.58  45.64  725
Social  Capital
<10  2.91  3.61  75  < 15  18.32  33.12  219
10-33  6.01  8.85  116  15-36  25.51  41.30  268
>= 33  4.18  7.75  124  >= 36  31.54  56.94  247
Gender
Male  4.02  8.77  70  Male  23.31  43.49  466
Female  4.67  7.16  246  Female  29.02  48.47  268
Total  4.53  7.53  316  Total  25.39  45.43  734
a Ratio  of number  of clients  to number  of suppliers.
This can be explained in that the smallest trading firms may typically buy in retail quantities and sell
in retail quantities. Finally, contrary to expectations, there appears to be relatively little distinction between
male and female traders in this activity, suggesting that retail activity is not exclusive to women.
6.  Market Performance
6.1  Margins
Gross Margins.  The gross margin-the  difference between the value of sales and purchases-
varies significantly between the two countries: it is 2.4 times higher in Malawi than  in Benin (t-value of
4.83). Median margins differ by  the same order of magnitude. Since total sales do not differ markedly
between the two countries, higher gross margins in Malawi must come from a
larger difference between buying and selling price.
46This is indeed the case: the ratio of selling price over buying price is  1.23 on average in Benin
(median of 1.19) while it is 1.53 in Malawi (median of 1.40). In other words, the selling price is on average
23% above the buying price in Benin but 53% above in Malawi. This difference is quite significant, with a t-
value of  11.7. This difference constitutes prima facie evidence that  agricultural trade  is in general less
efficient in Malawi.
Margins also vary  dramatically across traders. Some respondents appear to be making massive
losses while others make  windfall profits. Part of this  variation undoubtedly comes from measurement
error-since  respondents do not hold accounts, annual sales and purchases must be extrapolated on the basis
of a few key indicators. But the variation also suggests that unit margins are extremely volatile. Regarding
their last transaction, close to 3% of surveyed traders report selling at or below the purchase price. At the
other end of the spectrum, some traders report selling at close to 10 times the purchase price.
Table  28.  Annual  Gross  Margins  in Benin  and  Malawi
Benin
Mean  S.d.  Min.  Max.  Median  N
Gross  narginratio on annual  sales  22.10%  12.33% -18.62%  77.46%  20.26%  595
Gross  margin  rate  on last purchase  23.30%  23.72%  -64.29%  294.12%  18.52%  656
Annual  gross  margin($)  3123.13  6662.62  -88.72  58721.07  814.46  595
Annual  sales  ($)  22872.40  114659.57  15.14  2615833.30 5322.92  607
Annual  purchases($)  18147.20  91508.16  11.51  2098750.00 4254.71  607
Sale  price/purchase  price  1.23  0.24  0.36  3.94  1.19  656
Malawi
Mean  S.d.  Min.  Max.  Median  N
Gross  margin  ratio on annual  sales  48.06%  35.26%  6.30%  204.62%  38.67%  588
Gross  nargin rate  on last purchase  53.17%  60.85%  -87.43%  840.00%  39.53%  663
Annual  gross  margin  ($)  7386.84  20452.87  51.85  251876.18  1732.29  588
Annual  sales ($)  43611.15  182197.49  63.64  2848665.40 6728.57  598
Annual  purchases  ($)  32731.61  142789.69  35.45  2358541.20 4343.29  598
Sale  price/purchase  price  1.53  0.61  0.13  9.40  1.40  663
a  At  the time  of survey,  exchange  rates  were 1  US $= CFA  600  and 1  US $ = MK  45.
476.2  Costs
Variable marketing costs. Detailed information was collected on the various costs incurred in the process
of assembling, transporting, and selling the last quantities purchased. In the remainder of this section, we
refer to these costs as variable marketing costs because they vary with the amount purchased and the number
of transactions processed by the trader over the year. Variable marketing costs represent  $20 per ton in
Benin and  $31 in Malawi (t value of 8.43). Corresponding medians are  $16 and  $20. This compares to a
median purchase price of  $145 and  $162 per ton in Benin and Malawi, respectively.  Thus, for the median
trader, variable marketing costs represent 11% to 13% of the purchase price.
Table 29.  Variable Marketing Costs by Firm Assets (US$)'
Benin  Malawi
Relative  Relative
$Costs/ton  costs b  N  $Costs/ton  costs  b  N
Working  capital
<$167  Mean  (S.d)  11  (15)  8  (13)  174  <$78  Mean  (S.d)  30 (37)  16 (26)  200
$167-$667  Mean  (S.d)  21 (20)  14  (14)  248  $78-$244  Mean  (S.d)  32 (32)  15 (17)  220
>-  $667  Mean  (S.d)  25 (17)  18  (13)  216  >= $244  Mean (S.d)  30 (35)  20 (75)  232
Human resources
<=1 employee  Mean  (S.d)  16 (18)  12  (13)  358  0-1  employee  Mean  (S.d)  31 (34)  14 (18)  449
1-2  employees  Mean  (S.d)  22 (18)  14  (15)  152 >1 employees  Mean  (S.d)  30 (38)  24 (84)  187
>2 employees  Mean  (S.d)  24 (21)  16  (14)  144
Social  capital
< 10  Mean  (S.d)  16  (17)  13  (15)  185  < 15 Mean  (S.d)  26 (33)  18  (78)  191
10  -33  Mean  (S.d)  18  (17)  12  (12)  252  15-36  Mean  (S.d)  32 (35)  16  (26)  232
>= 33  Mean  (S.d)  24 (22)  15 (15)  222  >= 36 Mean  (S.d)  32 (36)  17  (27)  222
Gender
Male  Mean  (S.d)  21 (14)  15  (11)  127  Male Mean  (S.d)  29 (33)  19  (58)  428
Female  Mean  (S.d)  19  (20)  13  (15)  534  Female  Mean  (S.d)  34 (37)  12  (16)  217
Total  Mean  (S.d)  20 (19)  13  (14)  661  Mean (S.d)  31 (35)  17  (48)  645
Median  16  10  Median  20  9
a  At  the time  of survey,  exchange  rates  used are 1  US $=  CFA  600  and 1  US $ = MK  45.
b Relative  marketing  costs  are calculated  as the ratio of marketing  costs  to  purchase  price.
In Benin, absolute marketing costs per ton increase with traders' assets, revealing that as the scale of
operations rise, so too do the amount of services provided or commercial activities such as transport and
storage.  Similarly,  relative marketing costs also rise with asset base, suggesting that more endowed traders
48are more competitive in that their net margins (holding the purchase price constant across terciles) will be
lower, as will explored in the following section.  Marketing costs generally appear higher in Malawi and it
is less  clear that  costs  rise with increased assets, particularly in  relative terms.  In both  countries, as
expected, male traders incur higher absolute and relative marketing  costs.
Decomposition of Marketing Costs.  We now turn to the decomposition of variable marketing
costs.  Respondents were asked  to identify, for  their last completed transaction, all the  costs incurred
between the purchase and the sale of the transacted goods.  Thus, up to 19 types of costs were identified.
For  the purposes of analysis, these  costs are classified into  10 categories: the  cost of the empty sack,
handling costs (the sum of bagging and sewing, loading at place of purchase, and off-loading at destination),
the cost of transport itself, other transport-related costs such as payments at road stops and to transport
brokers, storage costs (if paid per bag), the cost of telephone or radio communication related to the particular
transaction, commissions paid to purchase and sales intermediaries and other tips, personal travel costs (if
the trader accompanies the shipment), municipal and market taxes (if paid per bag or transaction),  and other
non-specific costs.
Transport represents by  far the largest component of variable cost: 45%  in Benin and 40% in
Malawi. If we add other transport-related costs, we get a transport share of 49% in Benin.  This confirms
other empirical findings that transport represents the lion's share of marketing costs in sub-Saharan Africa
(Badiane et al,  1997; Gabre-Madhin, 1991).  The second most important variable cost component is the
travel cost incurred by  the trader.  This cost can be interpreted as the cost of search for partners and
information, since traders tend to  accompany the shipment themselves rather than conducting sales and
purchases by telephone or long-distance order.  This cost alone represents 11% of total marketing costs in
Benin and 23% in Malawi.  Together, transport of goods and of the trader represent the most significant
share, 60% in Benin and 63% in Malawi, of the financial outlays associated with an individual transaction.
The cost of bags and of handling represents important categories of variable costs. The value of bags
varies around $4 to  $6 per ton. Bags are recycled and re-used an average of 5 (Benin) to 9 times (Malawi),
49which brings down bagging costs.  The pro-rated cost of bags and the labor cost of bagging together account
for 7% to 10% of total variable costs.  This cost can also be viewed as directly related to the search for
information.  Traders indicate that re-sacking of the goods is customary at each transfer of ownership in
order to identify and ascertain that goods conform to the stated quality and quantity.  Moreover, the sacks
used  by  traders  are  themselves  non-standardized and  subject to  moral  hazard.  The  incidence and
significance of the cost of bagging, like that of personal travel by the trader, suggests the presence of market
failure in the facilitation of market exchange between buyers and sellers.  Similar results were obtained by
Gabre-Madhin (1998) in Ethiopian grain markets, where re-sacking is also customary, resulting in very high
handling costs of 25%.  In Benin and Malawi, handling costs represent 12 to 13% of total costs.  This lack of
standardized sacks and of grades and standards for traded products leads to the need to off-load and transfer
goods to different bags at  each assembly point in the marketing chain, resulting in significant losses in
economic welfare.
Commissions and tips account for 8% of variable costs in Benin but are negligible in Malawi. This
reflects a major difference in the role of intermediaries between the two countries. As expected, short-term
storage is less than 4% in both countries, confirming the lack of storage noted above.  Market taxes assessed
on quantities traded account for a very small fraction of variable costs: less than 3% of variable costs in both
countries.  With the exception of a very small number of traders, the use of telephone or other form of
telecommunication is virtually non-existent in both countries, confirming the inability of traders to reliably
conduct transactions without visually  inspecting goods and physically being present  for the transfer of
ownership.  This signals not only the lack of sophistication of agricultural trading in both countries but also
the significant constraints imposed by missing markets for market information and product certification.
50Figure 2a-b.  The Composition of Marketing  Costs in Benin and Malawi
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51Operating costs. Data were also collected on fixed operating costs. Average operating costs amount
to round  $550 per year in Benin vs.  $190 in Malawi. Survey results show that, in Benin, fixed operating
costs are dominated by vehicle maintenance and insurance. These costs, however, are incurred only by a
very small fraction of the  trader population, those with vehicles. The next  most important  fixed cost
category is storage and  pest  control. These costs  account for  21% (Malawi) to 34% (Benin) of fixed
operating costs, but they affect only a fourth to a third of surveyed traders; others stock at their residence or
at their own storage facility.
Taxes and fees amount to 44% of operating costs in Malawi, but as little as 5% in Benin. Even in
Malawi, however, the  burden of taxation remains  small:  $84 a year,  compared to  an average annual
turnover of around $43000. While very few traders pay income tax, market fees are paid by most of them-
50% in Benin, 80% in Malawi. For small traders, market fees are the only form of operating cost they incur.
Since market fees do not increase proportionally with trade volume, it affects primarily small to medium-
size traders; it is a regressive tax. Given that transport represents such a large component of traders' costs,
we speculate that traders probably pay more taxes through gasoline taxes than through all other forms of
taxation.
Other categories of operating costs such as wages and losses due to theft make small contributions
to costs. Total wages represent an extra cost of  $50 per year in Benin and  $110 in Malawi. This amount is
very small because so few traders employ paid workers and when they do, they pay them very little. Very
few traders borrow money. When they do, they borrow for such short periods that interest charges are, on
average, negligible. Losses due to theft average $22 a year in both countries.
We also collected detailed information on commissions paid to various intermediaries. These costs
are in principle included in variable costs, but we also collected the information separately. We again see
that commissions are much more frequent in Benin than in Malawi. This is particularly true for buying
agents and consignment agents. Benin traders spend on average four times more  on  commissions than
Malawian traders. To verify the information on the costs incurred for personal travel, the information was
52collected separately as well. Results confirm that personal travel represents a sizeable share of total costs: 17
to 18% of total variable costs in both countries.
To summarize, the structure of operating costs is dominated by transport costs. What is unexpected
is the large share of this transport cost covers the travel of the trader himself  or herself. The need for
thousands of traders to travel to the sale market in person-instead  of placing an order over the phone --
undoubtedly contributes to higher trading costs.
53Table 30.  Annual Operating Costs (US$) of Traders in Benin and Malawi'
Benin
Mean  S.d.  Min.  Max.  Median  N
Fixed costs:
Rental of shop/storage  74  472  0  10342  0  663
Pest control  116  1363  0  30417  0  663
Electricity  I  10  0  167  0  663
Telephone  19  268  0  6667  0  663
Maintenance of vehicles  292  3425  0  83333  0  663
Vehicle insurance  24  150  0  2150  0  663
Fees and market taxes  30  155  0  2129  0  663
Income tax on trading business  1  9  0  183  0  663
Total operating costs  557  3881  0  85279  13  663
Commissions  to agents:
Buying agents  254  903  0  12167  0  624
Brokers  71  458  0  6083  0  653
Consignment agents  87  255  0  2129  0  653
Travel costs:
To purchase  markets  297  1421  0  30720  142  537
To sales markets  177  805  0  13905  30  414
Loss due to theft  22  140  0  2500  0  659
Total wage bill  51  390  0  6083  0  629
Malawi
Mean  S.d.  Min.  Max.  Median  N
Fixed costs:
Rental of shop/storage  19  102  0  2489  0  738
Pest control  21  230  0  4148  0  737
Electricity  10  129  0  3318  0  737
Telephone  5  55  0  1227  0  737
Maintenance of vehicles  47  430  0  8182  0  737
Vehicle insurance  5  76  0  1591  0  737
Fees and market taxes  69  336  0  8295  50  736
Income tax on trading business  15  337  0  9091  0  733
Total operating costs  188  806  0  11818  66  730
Commissions to agents:
Buying agents  45  384  0  8295  0  735
Brokers  52  433  0  8295  0  735
Consigmnent agents  2  41  0  1091  0  734
Travel costs:
To purchase  markets  443  1348  0  23636  213  564
To sales markets  1219  4843  0  47273  65  219
Loss due to theft  22  121  0  2273  0  727
Total wage bill  111  853  0  20739  0  726
a  At the time of survey, exchange rates used are 1 US $= CFA 600 and I US $ = MK 45.
54Table 31.  Traders' Cost Structure by Working Capital in Benin and Malawi
Benin  Malawi
Fixed  Variable  Fixed  Variable
Total  Marketing  operating  operating  Total  Marketing  operating  operating
Tercile  costs  costs  costs  costs  Tercile  costs  costs  costs  costs
<$167  Mean  427  393  30  3  < $78  658  537  105  16
S.d.  1001  990  102  10  1826  1718  539  76
Median  58  22  8  0  206  119  65  0
N  154  159  174  168  175  185  243  232
Mean  1533  1380  113  25  904  736  77  66
$167-$667S.d.  3981  3664  782  80 $78 -$244  1408  1294  58  311
Median  341  311  9  0  419  300  65  0
N  213  226  249  235  183  193  238  240
>=$667  Mean  6947  6731  7149  238  >=$244  10366  25152  116  402
S.d.  15152  31485  77453  778  52451  207759  269  1503
Median  2714  2015  81  43  1582  1460  65  80
N  173  201  216  186  171  197  215  238
Total  Mean  2952  2948  2469  86  Total  3881  9037  99  162
S.d.  9355  18761  45089  451  30128  121967  353  905
Median  515  457  14  0  503  390  65  0
N  540  586  639  589  529  575  696  710
6.3  Net Marketing  Margins  and Annual  Profits
Net Marketing Margins on Last Transaction.  For the last transaction, net margins are obtained
by subtracting total variable marketing cost from the gross marketing margin, which is equal to the price
spread between purchase and sales price.  Net margins in terms of dollars per ton are considerably higher
(8.4 times) in Malawi, with a sample average of $194/ton compared to $23 in Benin.  This supports our
earlier findings that competition is greater in Benin.  Net margins appear to  vary significantly in both
countries, with no discernible effect of firm assets or gender on net margin levels in either country.
Further, it is striking that 23% of traders in Benin and 8% in Malawi report a negative net margin.
This is in part due to negative gross margins, where the price spread is negative, for 3% of the sample in
Benin.  However, beyond the relative small frequency of negative price  spreads, it appears that a  large
proportion of traders, particularly in Benin, did not cover their costs in the last transaction.  In part, this
55finding indicates the presence of competition, but it also suggests possible measurement error of the variable
marketing costs.  In particular, sources of error are the cost of personal travel, which covers the entire
shipment. Personal travel costs are subject to economies of scale as well as of scope. This is because traders
may take advantage of a trip to take care of personal business or to engage in other, more profitable,
commercial activities, which are not captured in our measure of profit.
Table 32.  Net Margins ($/ton) by Firm Assets in Benin and Malawi
Benin  Malawi
Margin<O  Margin<0
Terciles  Mean  S.d.  Median  (%)  N  Terciles  Mean  S.d. Median  (%)  N
Working  capital
<$167  27.44  47.52  19.17  13.2  171  <$78  82.58  129.18  47.17  6.1  194
$167-$667  18.60  46.84  11.29  24.9  247  $78-$244  111.85  133.95  68.22  6.1  215
>-$667  24.56 141.75  10.42  30.6  215  >=$244  133.40  270.66  35.70  11.7  225
Human  resources
<--1 employee  21.00  50.82  16.24  22.0  356  <=-lemployee  100.89  134.49  55.52  6.5  441
1-2 employees  21.40  48.31  11.88  27.6  149  >1 employee  135.98  289.60  28.85  11.3  184
>2 employees  30.90 168.29  9.65  23.6  143
Social  Capital
< 10  31.07 146.34  14.83  19.5  184  <15  108.05  205.56  44.44  9.1  189
10-33  24.91  50.87  14.28  22.1  249  15-36  109.90  198.87  46.00  7.4  227
>=33  14.95  56.89  10.86  28.4  220  >= 36  113.38  177.73  55.38  7.7  218
Gender
Male  32.56 181.61  7.54  28.3  127  Male  109.01  216.59  42.92  9.4  424
Female  20.99  46.25  14.30  22.2  528  Female  113.65  136.47  66.00  5.6  210
Total  23.24  90.00  13.13  23.4  655  Total  110.55  193.66  47.39  8.0  634
Annual Profits.  We construct estimates of profits from trading.  Profit is computed as the
annual sales minus annual purchases minus annualized variable costs  minus  annual wages paid  minus
annual operating costs. In case agricultural trade only represents part of the revenue of the surveyed trader,
annual purchases and sales were inflated accordingly. Traders who derive less than  10% of their annual
revenue from agricultural trader  are omitted. The resulting profit represents payments to  self-provided
56factors of production such as working capital, owned storage facilities, equipment, and vehicles, and unpaid
labor by the entrepreneur and family helpers.
Computed profits  suffer from severe measurement error. This is because they  are obtained by
subtracting poorly measured costs from poorly measured revenues. Measurement errors therefore tend to
compound themselves and individual measures of profit should be regarded with caution. Average profits,
however, should provide a reasonable approximation of what profits from trading must look like in the two
surveyed countries.
After eliminating the upper and lower one percent of the distribution, we find that 21% of surveyed
traders do not cover their operations and wage costs out of annual sales (28% in Benin,  15% in Malawi).
Annual profits also vary dramatically across countries, with the median profit in Malawi --  $1003 -- nearly
ten times higher than in Benin-  $119. For most Benin respondents, trade provides but a small return on
entrepreneurship and capital. This suggests that competition is fierce in Benin, less so in Malawi.
Results show that traders' profits are non-negligible: $1340 on average in Benin,  $6140 in Malawi.
The difference between the two countries is significant (t value of 6.03). Median profits, however, are much
lower:  $120 in Benin,  $1140 in Malawi. This corresponds to an average profit rate on turnover of 6% in
Benin and 14% in Malawi. Profits amount to 32% of the gross margin (difference between buying price and
selling price) in Benin; the corresponding figure for Malawi is 57%2.  Median profit rates are 37% and 64%,
respectively. Since, if anything, Malawian traders have less equipment and working capital and use less
family labor than their Benin counterparts, higher profit rates cannot be explained as higher payment to self-
provided factors of production. It therefore appears that Malawian traders are less competitive.
2 To minimize  bias,  this  figure  is obtained  after elimninating  traders  who  do not derive  all their revenue  from  agricultural
trade.
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Benin
Mean  S.d.  Min.  Max.  Median  N
Profit  rate  on annual  sales  3.9%  18.9%  -114.8%  57.7%  5.5%  559
Annualprofit($)b  1338.81  5537.11  -9163.71  68593.59  119.05  559
Malawi
Mean  S.d.  Min.  Max.  Median  N
Profitrate  on annual  sales  14.1%  18.2%  -80.3%  57.1%  14.9%  549
Annual  profit ($)  b  6140.68  17989.06  -4173.45  172689.50  1142.11  545
a Profit  = Gross  margin  - variable  costs  - operating  costs  - wage  bill.
b  At the time  of survey,  exchange  rates  were 1  US $=  CFA 600  and I US $ = MK  45.
These average profit rates mask a  great deal of variation across traders.  A  large proportion of
surveyed traders -- 20% -- appear to be making losses. On the other hand, some traders appear to be making
astronomical profits. It is unclear how much of this variation is due to measurement error, but the extent of it
suggests that profits from trade are likely to be very variable. Agricultural trade is a risky venture.
Further analysis of absolute levels of annual profits broken down by firm assets and gender provides
evidence of significant returns to working capital as well as to social capital in both countries.  Median
profits nearly double between working capital terciles in Benin and nearly triple in Malawi.  Returns to
social capital are also high in both countries, though somewhat lower than that of financial capital.  In
contrast to Malawi, profits are nearly half for traders in the middle tercile compared to the bottom tercile.
This suggests that the one-person enterprises, typically of women retailers, are more profitable than the
slightly larger firms.  As firms grow beyond the threshold level of 2 employees, profitability then increases.
Finally, as expected, male traders have considerably higher profit levels than women in both countries.
The figures below confirm that across countries for each type of firm asset and gender, traders in
Malawi have considerably higher profit rates, defined as the ratio of annual profits to the value of annual
sales, than their counterparts in Benin.  What is also revealing is that, unlike the case of absolute profit
levels, there is no clear pattern of the impact of assets on profit rates.
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Benin  Malawi
Mean  S.d.  Median  N  Mean  S.d.  Median  N
Working
Capital
<$167  520.62  1875.13  79.20  145  < $78  737.24  1956.37  297.89  173
$167-$667  888.82  2706.06  133.86  210  $78 - $244  1994.70  4692.99  865.52  182
>=$667  2737.89  10465.61  210.42  162  >=$244  9069.13  67011.87  2690.47  170
Human resources
<1  employee  3213.70  11315.70  142.51  58  0-1 employee  2815.60  10364.75  650.58  389
1-2 employees  778.78  4097.84  73.74  262  >1 employee  6890.15  73390.51  2086.36  136
>2 employees  1500.48  6200.78  223.12  215
Social capital
< 10  81.54  1807.44  72.68  146  < 15  2698.08  7433.28  466.34  155
10 - 33  1053.35  3794.99  100.17  219  15 - 36  4540.01  59066.08  767.73  194
>= 33  2781.78  9693.72  273.96  170  >= 36  4166.85  22465.76  1428.90  176
Gender
Male  3929.95  12442.11  291.25  103  Male  5002.94  47520.49  1252.62  339
Female  712.65  2866.97  94.87  433  Female  1808.24  5690.83  425.17  186
Total  1330.90  6145.03  102.83  536  Total  3871.10  38345.75  884.50  525
59Figure 3a-d  Annual  Profit Rates by Firm Assets in Benin and Malawi a
| o Benin  |o  aBenin  16
186  '  Malawi  16  14
161  14-/
14  12  4L>14  31 
X  12 /  |  t  l  E~~~~~  12  10X 
O12  2 14  Z  10-Z 
0
>  12  "Z~~~~~~~~~.  - 0~  E
0  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0-
1  *2  3  1  2  3
Working  Capital  Terciles  Social  Capital  Terciles
14  - 1  4  1  3~~~~~~~~~~1
12-z~~~~~~~  12  Eaawaw
0  z  ~~~~~~~~~~~0
E  10-1  E~~~1  -O
4--
a.  2~~~~6 
24~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  2
1  2  3Gender
Human  Capital  Tercile  O= Male  2=Female)
Profit  rate=%  annual  profitl  value  of sales.
607.  CONCLUSIONS  AND  POLICY  OPTIONS
We have given a detailed description of how agricultural traders operate in Benin and Malawi, two
countries fairly representative of western and eastern and southern Africa.  Many of the features we have
documented were well-known-small  size of businesses, lack of equipment, rudimentary business practices,
and the dominant role of transport costs. Other features were less well known, such as the importance of
personal travel, bagging practices, the short distances over which most traders operate, and the incidence of
theft and breach of contract.
We were also able to dispel some myths. For instance we documented the absence of speculative,
inter-seasonal storage for the overwhelming majority of traders, and the relatively low returns to storage in
general. We showed that advances from traders to farmers are of short duration-one  to two weeks. Their
main purpose is not to exploit farmers' need for cash in order to finance agricultural production, but rather a
means for traders to secure future deliveries.
The picture that emerges from this analysis is one that is dominated by transport-for  goods and for
traders. Because trading enterprises are small, the quantities they can gather from any one market are limnited
by  what the trader can reliable locate,  finance, and inspect. As a result, transport takes place in small
vehicles-pick-up  trucks for the most part.  An inordinate amount of personal travel takes place as well,
since traders must inspect the goods they purchase and payment is normally in cash upon delivery.
Surveyed traders appear to work effectively under the constraints they face, which are many-e.g.,
limited external finance, no brand names and trademarks, no  certified quality, no  organized commodity
exchange, extremely decentralized production and consumption. They rely on networks to share information
and discourage breach of contract and are able to perform an essential trading function in a flexible and
expeditious manner. But the end result nevertheless is a costly system that provides  a limited service to
consumers and producers.
Another feature worth emphasizing is the simplicity of the equipment used by most traders. Few
traders own scales or processing equipment. Storage often takes place at home. While a small minority owns
61vehicles, most traders rely on external providers to transport their goods and themselves. Agricultural goods
are mostly transported in small pick-up trucks. These were shown to have higher costs. Most capital is tied
up in inventories and, for some traders, in short-term credit to customers. Reliance on external finance is
extremely limited. The only form of borrowing that is common in both countries is loans from friends and
relatives to deal with short-term emergencies. Working capital, however, is not sufficient for commercial
success if it is not combined with business contacts.
The modernization of agricultural trade requires that original solutions be found to the genuine
problems that traders face. The only 'modern' technologies Benin and Malawian traders seem to be using at
this point are motorized transport and pest control. Telephones and banks are ignored. Brand recognition,
grading, and  quality certification are non-existent. Brokers and  agents are not organized in commodity
exchanges. Quantities are not pooled for transport and storage so as to achieve returns to scale. Inter-
seasonal and inter-regional arbitrage is outside the purview of most traders, who prefer to operate in a small
territory on a day-by-day basis. By extension, an entire continent is fed using a rudimentary, costly, and
risky set-up.
The information presented here provides some important insights as to how agricultural trade can be
improved.  Policy interventions can be conceived in four main areas:  (i) increasing traders' asset base; (ii)
reducing transaction risk; (iii) promoting more sophisticated business practices; and, (iv) reducing physical
marketing costs.
Increasing Traders  'Assets
One possible approach to reduce marketing costs and improve agricultural markets is to help traders
invest in modern equipment. We were surprised by the virtual absence of scales and processing equipment
(such as  grain dryers and  grading machines) and  reliance on  small-scale home  storage. One possible
interpretation is that traders do not invest in such equipment because it is not profitable. This may be true for
small traders but is unlikely to be correct for large trading operations. We believe that these avenues should
62be explored. One should keep in mind, however, that as large traders get better equipped and hopefully more
efficient, they should drive out some of the smaller traders, who predominantly tend to be women.
Improving access to external finance should also be attempted. It is shocking, for instance, to note
that large traders do not even have an overdraft facility. For certain traders - those with adequate experience
and good business contacts - access to more finance would undeniably help them grow and prosper. But we
are not convinced that increasing widespread access to external finance would improve the efficiency of
agricultural markets in  general: easier finance may help  some traders  increase their  market share and
eliminate competitors, but need not result in lower prices for consumers or higher prices for producers. The
reason is that business practices remain quite rudimentary, making it difficult if not impossible for trading
operations to grow beyond a certain size and remain competitive.
Our results  suggest that  larger  traders  have higher margins. There  are  at  least three  possible
explanations for this  finding. First, it is possible that larger traders  conduct more profitable  operations,
involving more risky and more capital intensive activities such as storage and long-distance transport. If this
interpretation is correct, larger traders are more profitable on average because they capture returns to risk
taking and  scarce capital. A  second possible interpretation is that  agricultural trade,  as  it is currently
practiced, is characterized by decreasing returns to scale: large traders have higher margins because they are
inefficiently large. Normally, competition should weed out inefficient firms and  align margins. But  the
forces of competition might be hindered by privilege and political clientelism.
Thirdly, large firms might have higher margins because they exert market power. The presence of a
large  number of  small traders  would normally  be  sufficient to  discipline  large  traders.  But the  crude
transaction practices of the competitive fringe compare to  the slightly more efficient practices of large
traders might result in increasing returns to scale. If this interpretation is correct, the fact that large firms
with high margins coexist with small firms with low margins suggests that large firms act monopolistically:
if they wanted, they could eliminate the competitive fringe by reducing their price. The fact that they do not
is evidence of insufficient competition among large firms.
63In this respect the comparison between Benin and Malawi is instructive. Gross margins and unit
profits are noticeably lower in Benin than in Malawi. At the same time there appears to be more competition
and smaller trading firms in Benin. At prima facie, this would suggest that more competition favors smaller
margins. Population density is also much higher in Benin and crop production is spread more evenly over
the year. This implies more geographical concentration in traders'  operations, and  less need for storage.
Together, these features could explain the lower costs of intermediation in Benin. These issues will be the
object of further research.
Reducing Transaction  Risk
Our work shows that rudimentary business practices can largely be blamed on transaction risk.
Payment takes place at delivery, a practice that precludes invoicing and payment by check and complicates
accounting. Goods have to be  inspected upon delivery because the  supplier is not trusted to provide a
reliable account of the quality and quantity sold. Grain has to be physically moved from one bag to another
at each sale transaction. This facilitates inspection but raises costs and slows down trade. Business networks
have developed as a partial palliative to these problems, but they are insufficient to eliminate them. Besides,
networks have other problems (Fafchamps 1999).
It is not entirely clear how in practice transaction risk can be reduced. The court system by itself is
unlikely to suffice because agricultural market transactions  are seldom large enough to go to court, assuming
that breach of contract could be demonstrated and that the defendant has assets that can be foreclosed upon.
One institutional  innovation that could potentially reduce transaction risk would be for markets authorities to
take a pro-active stance. Membership in traders association  could in principle be used as a guarantee of good
conduct. Traders shown to breach contracts would be ousted from the association. The existence of traders
associations in Benin suggests that such approach might be possible by strengthening and advising existing
associations.
Traders  associations could  also  intervene  in  grading and  quality  certification.  An  association
equipped with a grain dryer and simple grading equipment could bag and certify its products in a manner
64that is difficult to falsify. Reassured about the quality of the goods they purchase, buyers may be more
willing to place orders by phone.
Another approach would focus on agents and brokers who could, in principle, serve as essential link
between unknown buyer and seller. Gabre-Madhin (1998) has documented how this  system works in the
case of the Ethiopian grain market. A core of experienced brokers would be required before a commodity
exchange could be set up. The existence of such an exchange would in turn facilitate the circulation of
information by  publicizing current and  future grain prices. Albeit the creation ad nihilo of commodity
exchanges in Benin and Malawi is not something  we recommend for the near future, assisting the emergence
of  grain brokers coupled  with grading and  quality certification by  traders'  associations would lay the
foundation for a commodity exchange in the more distant future.
Promoting Sound Business Practices
Benin and Malawian traders manage to feed the population of their respective country by collecting
and distributing food among millions of producers and consumers. They do so in difficult circumstances and
demonstrate great ingenuity. Perhaps even more remarkably, many of them appear to be making a living
from their trading activity. All this notwithstanding, business practices appear inefficient. As argued earlier,
exchange takes a cumbersome form. This enables a myriad of small traders to compete with larger ones. But
cumbersome practices increase the costs of the entire marketing system.
The question is how  to  capture increasing returns to scale  from modern trading practices. Put
differently, how can we enable large traders to adopt modern transaction methods so that they can reduce
their costs and drive small traders out. One possibility is to favor large traders directly, for instance through
credit programs and restrictions to entry. These policies have been tried elsewhere and have generally failed
to  induce large  traders to modernize and become more efficient.  Another approach is  to  support the
'modernization' of trading practices irrespective of firm size. If modern practices are, as expected, efficiency
enhancing, those traders that begin using them should grow and eventually displace others. One example of
such approach would be  to upgrade markets by installing telephones  and faxes,  providing cheap good
65quality  sacks, and  facilitating  loading and  off-loading. Simple processing  equipment could also made
available to traders, in exchange for a user fee. It is likely that some experimentation is required to identify
suitable innovations - and the right sequence of innovations. A pilot project on market support would be the
ideal vehicle for such experimentation.
Reducing Physical Marketing Costs
Physical marketing costs constitute the bulk of traders' costs. Although many of these physical costs
are ultimately the result of transactions costs (e.g., the need for traders to travel to the point of purchase and
sale), there is ample scope for lowering marketing costs by reducing transport costs. Various policies could
be used to address the high cost of transport. Direct measures, such as reducing gasoline taxes, would
undoubtedly have an effect, at the expense of much needed government revenues. Measures to improve the
maintenance of rural feeder roads are urgently needed. Devolving maintenance to local administration is an
option to study. Its coTollary  is that local administration  must be granted taxing authority, e.g., the right to
set up toll roads or other forms of road taxation.
Another innovation worth exploring is the expansion of transport brokerage  services. We have
shown that transport costs could be reduced by using larger trucks. This is currently difficult because of the
small size and decentralized  nature of traders' operations. Transport brokers would take possession of cargo,
rent out space on large trucks, and deliver to traders in their sales market. Our observations suggest that such
practices are already present, but not sufficiently widespread. We suspect that the fear of breach of contract
is a strong obstacle to the development of these practices. Better trust between traders and transport brokers
should greatly simplify  the organization of transport, thereby reducing costs.
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